

‘Space-Time’ Set — <Empire>, Westphalian Myth, and Temporality: Trilogy on the spatiotemporal theory of the study of international and global relations

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This is a translation of the Introduction and the second part of three chapters of my book, *Thoughts and Behaviour on ‘Global Relations’* (Koyo Shobo, 2024). The first one was originally published in 2006, in Norihisa Yamashita ed., *On Empire* (Kodansha Sensho Metier). The second was originally published in 2016, in Norihisa Yamashita, Hiroaki Ataka, and Atsushi Shibasaki eds., *Deconstructing the Westphalian Discourse: International Relations as Historiography* (Nakanishiya Publishing), Chapter 1. The third one was originally published in 2021, in Ryosuke Takahashi and Nozomu Yamazaki eds., *Challenge to Chrono-Politics: Temporal Turn in the study of political science* (Minerva Publishing), Chapter 11.

The brief guidance of those papers are to be found in Introduction: The History of the Idea of Global Relations as a Movement for the Perception of the World of Universal Relations in *JOGMS* 34, “‘Un Poco Loco’ Set-Trilogy on Future of the Study of International Relations: From IR, GIR, to the Study of Global Relations and beyond”.

Chapter 4: <Empire> and “empire” in International Relations Studies

Introduction

The author’s assignment is to sort out how the theory of empire is dealt with in the field of international relations studies (a general term for international relations, international relations, international politics, etc.). However, what we are going to consider here is an argument that mobilizes the concept of empire as a term that refers to the current state of the world, and empire and imperialism in the past, at least before World War II, are basically outside the range of concern. Therefore, the primary purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the theory of empire as an argument that seeks to describe the current state of the world from the perspective of international relations studies, and to clarify its characteristics.

However, fulfilling this purpose also means considering the significance of discussing the concept of empire for the study of international relations. To put it a little further, it is necessary to consider the possibility that the very discussion of empire may be an embryonic opportunity to re-examine the state of international relations research, whether partially or in whole. This is because there is no guarantee that the scope of the theory of empire will automatically and comfortably be included within existing studies of international relations. Therefore, it is not sufficient to evaluate the significance of the theory of empire only by associating it with the existing fields of international relations as a form of various intellectual trends in the study of international relations. Therefore, it proves necessary to consider whether the very act of discussing empire is a request for a change in existing international relations research¹.

1 The use of the words “empire” and <Empire> to talk about the world and international relations is itself a phenomenon of international relations in the sense of “karma” (Tat) as a linguistic act. Therefore, as with the “clash of civilizations,” “soft power,” “human security,” etc., the simultaneous explosion of a discourse on a global basis, so to speak, and its mass consumption (which is usually forgotten in large quantities) should also be a subject of study. I would like to leave this point for another time.

1. Basic premises

The premise of the discussion in this chapter consists in the following three points. As is well known, there are two main types of current theories of empire: the American “Empire” theory and the Negri and Hardt theory of <Empire> (hereafter, <Empire> is Negri-Hardt’s concept). The first point is a discussion of the mutual image of these two theories of empire. As with Negri and Hardt, if we assume the existence of an <Empire>, regardless of what kind of “Empire” is specifically described, logically “Empire” encompasses <Empire>. On the other hand, as is the case with most discussions in international relations studies, it is possible to have a theory of “empire” without presupposing <Empire>. In other words, we can distinguish between the argument that the sovereign state entity of the United States will become an “empire” and the argument that an <Empire> will emerge that exercises postmodern sovereignty over the world as a network of which the United States is a part. The consequence of this is that from the point of view of the <Empire> theory, the “empire” theory may appear to constitute a part of the <Empire> theory, while the “empire” theory does not necessarily consider the self to belong to the <Empire> theory.

The second important point is that, while the theory of <Empire> posits in a more or less abstract and idealistic way of positing a multitude that is antagonistic to <Empire> and confronts it as a counterpower, the theory of “empire” does not propose a seemingly new concept of the subject of such subjects. This point is easy to explain because mainstream international relations studies have a policy-oriented character from the standpoint of rulers and policymakers. However, an examination of the “empire” theory reveals that the transnational activities are fully aware of the existence of forces, if not multitudes, that are situated completely beyond the control of the international system level, and the growing influence that they have on world politics. In other words, just as the theory of “empire” constitutes a view of the world only when it includes both <Empire> and multitude, the theory of <Empire> is not only an “imperial” system, but also a so-called global civil society or group that the imperial system controls, sometimes coexists, and sometimes cooperates or opposes². It is only in conjunction with the space in which transnational relationships are developed, including the global public domain, that it should be grasped as a view of the world.

Third, in considering the relationship between “empire” and <Empire>, it is essential to consider the theory of power that constitutes the order forming the basis of the problems of the world order. While the theory of <Empire> is based on biopower, which progresses from discipline to management derived from Foucault, and biopolitical production, which depends on it, the theory of “empire” barely brings up the power of culture or values in addition to military power and economic power, which has been mainly dealt with in the theory of international relations so far. Or soft power, which is strategically designated as a counter-concept to hard power derived from Nye. Both the theories of <Empire> and multitude and biopower, as well as the theories of “empire” and transnational relations and values or soft power, have emerged reflecting the changes in world politics from the latter half of the 20th century to the present in the 21st century, and to the extent that they do so, they contain a common “awareness” of the current state of the world. At the same time, however, there are irreconcilable differences between the two in terms of how they are understood, represented, and prescriptions. Due to the width of the paper in this chapter, I would like to mention this point only as a supplementary argument.

I do not mean to argue that scholars of international relations should not ride the back of the theory of <Empire> and biopower as a kind of intellectual trend. On the other hand, I do not mean to argue that the

2 Mary Kaldor, *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*, Polity Press, 2003; id., “The Idea of Global Society”, *International Affairs* 79-3 (2003), pp. 583-593.

3 John Gerard Ruggie, “Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues, Actors, and Practices”, *European Journal of International Relations* 10-4 (2004), pp. 499-531.

theory of "empire" and value or soft power fails to effectively describe the real world. As will be explained later, it is in a sense natural that current research on international relations mainly studies "empire" without <Empire>. What is more important is to pave the way for a comprehensive understanding of the "empire" and <Empire> theories. In other words, while the study of international relations analyzes "empires," it asks why they do not (or are reluctant to) delve so much into the question of the overall structure of the world that "empires" aim for. And to try to understand the reason for this from a different perspective than the cliché-like critique of the discipline, which simply states that the study of international relations has become narrower because it cannot escape the spell of state-centrism. In other words, I believe that the academic significance lies in drawing out points that contribute to an attempt to understand the world buried in both, rather than dividing them academically by accentuating the discrepancy between the two⁴.

Based on the above perspective, this chapter attempts to discuss the aspects of the theory of <Empire> and the reference to the theory of "empire" in the study of international relations. Specifically, we will grasp the relationship between <Empire> and "empire" or "empire" in international relations research by outlining the reception of the theory of "empire" in international relations studies in "2" (2) and "3" by organizing the aspects of the theory of "empire" in international politics. In "4" and below, we will examine how the study of international relations can commit to "empires" and <Empires>.

2 Empire from the Perspective of International Relations Studies

Surprisingly, from the perspective of researchers and intellectuals who have read and thought about the theory of <Empire>, there are surprisingly few studies of international relations that consider the theory of <Empire>, and even fewer accept it as an analytical framework. International relations studies overwhelmingly deal with the theory of "empire," especially after 9/11, the theory of American "empire." In the first place, there are not many direct references to Negri and Hardt's writings from the perspective of international relations scholars⁵. A glance at the series of works related to the so-called American "empire" theory that will be examined in the next section shows very little reference to Negri and Hardt, let alone to

4 On the other hand, I have doubts about why the structure of the world in the 21st century must be described in terms of <Empire>, or "empire," which is steeped in various historical connotations, especially people's grudges. There is a difference between what is frequently used in the street and the question whether it is appropriate or effective as an academic analytical concept, and there is a problem that cannot be avoided not only in international relations research but also in the social sciences in general, such as the necessity of distinguishing between analytical and practical concepts, academic terms and policy terms, and the confusion and confusion in reality (Ryuhei Hatsuse, "Human Security" The Direction of Theory," *Kyoto Women's University Journal of Contemporary Society*, Nos. 4 and 5 (2003), pp. 81-95). However, no other terms have yet been found that can describe the current structure of the world in a way that appears convincing to many people. This may be a manifestation of the historical paradox that because we are living in the same era, we are not able to accurately represent that era.

5 As one of the few exceptions, in addition to Yamamoto's paper, which will be described later, Inui Endo, "Sovereignty, Empire (ism), and Democracy: The Scope of the 'Empire' Theory," Osamu Nishitani et al., *The Asymmetric World: The Scope of 'Empire'*, Ibunsha, 2005, pp. 53-84. In addition, by Japan researchers, Tetsuya Sakai, "Book Review Forum," *Diplomatic Forum*, December 2003, p. 96, Japan Peace Society, ed., *"Prospects for World Government"* (Peace Studies, No. 28), Tetsuro Kato's "War and Peace in the Age of Global Information Warfare," Hiroyuki Tosa, "Three Idealisms in the Early 21st Century of Crisis," and Hideki Suga, "The Current Situation of American Empire Theory and the Future of the World Order," Kato, "Is Globalization the End of the Welfare State?" *Hitotsubashi Ronshu*, October 2003. Nozomu Yamazaki, "Democracy in 'Empire'," *Sobun*, August 2004, Yamazaki, "Between Westphalia and 'Empire'," *International Politics*, No. 137, 2004, etc. As a partial reference, Kiichi Fujiwara, *Empire of Democracy*, Iwanami Shinsho, 2002, pp. 17-19. Kiichi Fujiwara, Jong-Yuan Lee, Yoshiko Koshiro, and Jun Ishida, eds., *Lectures on International Politics 4: Changes in the International Order*, University of Tokyo Press, 2004, Seiji Endo, "Functions and Structural Changes in Norms in International Politics," pp. 102-103, and Ryo Oshiba, "Democracy and International Order," pp. 273-277.

associate “empire” with <Empire>.

This situation reveals the basic stance of international relations research, which is to understand (or have to understand) the theory of <Empire> primarily as an argument that is being developed “outside” the study of international relations by Negri, a “left-wing” continental intellectual. For many scholars of international relations, the discussion of <Empire> may be “like feeling left behind in the dizzying rays of abstract language.”⁶ However, the fact that the theory of American “empire” is possible without the theory of <Empire> does not logically imply that the study of <Empire> has nothing to do with the study of international relations. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the theory of <Empire> from the standpoint of international relations research.

In 2002, Berkawi and Rafi co-authored a paper in *Millennium*, a postmodern-oriented journal in the field of International Relations (IR),⁷ and two essays by Carinicos, Shaw, and Walker in response.⁸

The Theory of <Empire> in *Millennium*

Berkawi (University of Wales) and Rafi (University of London), who are also known for their research on democratic peace theory, point out that one of the advantages of the ⁹theory of empire compared to other analyses as a total analysis is that it can enrich IR, which tends to focus only on interactions between sovereign states. As has already been discussed in various places, the Westphalian model of the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which focused only on the establishment of a modern system of sovereign states in Western Europe, was nothing more than a myth, and in the process of the formation of the modern world, relations between sovereign states were simultaneously affected. Far more relationships between sovereign states and non-sovereign state actors have arisen and developed around the world. The perspective of “the Imperial” reveals these relations that “the International” has concealed, and discloses that international relations as relations between sovereign states have been constructed in mutual reference at the same time as relations with non-sovereign state actors. Thus, the perspective of <Empire> contributes to the introduction of the “territorial trap” that IR tends to fall into, i.e., the analysis of periphery and subaltern, which tends to be invisible by containing social relations in the container of the territorial sovereign state.

They cite three issues that exist within the theory of empire itself: (1) the introduction of the concept of multitudes, (2) the shift to postmodern sovereignty, and (3) the end of classical imperialism. With regard to the first point, by developing the Marxist schema of the proletariat and imperialism as the interconstructive nature of multitude and <Empire>, and by placing the various power relations that arise in the “international” in the context of biopower, the relations between social forces that are difficult to properly scoop out in mainstream IR are more (in Giarts’ terms) “thick” Evaluate the points that you will be able to write. With regard to the second point, I criticize the introduction of the perspective of empire, which is often overlooked by the genealogy of sovereignty that has been tackled by some constructivists and postmodernists, which makes it possible to analyze the interconstructivity mentioned above, but also overemphasizes the transition to postmodern sovereignty. As for the third point, I criticize the overestimation of the disappearance of the “outside” and the impossibility of imperialism after economic globalization and the Tet Offensive. The

6 Endo, supra, p. 80

7 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International Relations”, *Millennium*, 31-1 (2002), pp. 109-127.

8 Alex Callinicos, “The Actuality of Imperialism”, *Millennium* 31-2 (2002), pp. 319-326, Martin Shaw, “PostImperial and Quasi-Imperial: State and Empire in the Global Era”, *ibid.*, pp. 327-336, R. B. J. Waker, “On the Immanence / Imminence of Empire”, *ibid.*, pp. 337-345.

9 Barkawi and Laffey eds., *Democracy, Liberalism and War: Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate*, Lynne Rienner Press, 2001; *id.*, “The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization”, *European Journal of International Relations* 5-4(1999), pp. 403-434.

current situation should be understood as the emergence of an “international state” dominated by the United States through the framework of international organizations, and imperialist behavior has not yet disappeared.

In the end, both the theory of <Empire>, which is based on the constitution of the United States, which was born in the process of independence from the empire of Great Britain in contrast to the Old World, and the IR, which is rooted in the idea of contrasting the empire of the old world with the state of the United States, are both American, and they obscure the imperial reality in world politics. Therefore, in order to make use of the theory of <Empire> in IR, it is important to incorporate the perspective of such imperial relations.

Next, let us examine the arguments of the three men published in response to the Berkawi & Rafi paper. First, let us ¹⁰take a look at the arguments of Carinikos, a hardcore leftist who is also a regular on New Left Review. He cites the strengths of the theory of empire as (1) the revival of the Marxist approach, (2) its contribution to the study of globalization, and (3) its optimism in a good sense. But because of this, the Empire is seriously flawed. First, there is a lack of a full-fledged analysis of the economic aspect, second, the concept of multitude is unclear as an analytical concept that goes beyond a mere expression of good intentions by Negri and Hardt, and third, it fails to empirically demonstrate the “end” of the conflict between nations. On the other hand, while I agree with the arguments of Berkawi and Rafi that the methodological implications of <Empire> can incorporate relationships overlooked by the “international,” I do not believe that what they call a “U.S.-dominated international state” has emerged. In the first place, the theory of <Empire> is the assertion that a single <Empire> has emerged after the end of the phase of the struggle of imperialism, but when talking about the restoration of “empire” by Berkawi and Rafi, elements of “empire” and <Empire> are mixed.

Furthermore, they take a one-line view of U.S. dominance over international organizations such as NATO and the IMF, and simply think that global = Western, so they overlook the bipolar confrontation during the Cold War and the movements of Russia and China after the Cold War. International organizations can bind the United States, and they have become a forum for countries to fight each other over the direction of the organization. In addition, there are political, military, and economic tensions in U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China relations, and military force cannot be easily exercised in practice. As Huntington says, this world should be understood as a strange hybrid of a unipolar and multipolar system, and there is no international state or “world state.” Interstate politics still continues, and in the conditions of power imbalances, the presence of nuclear weapons, and the omnipresence of crisis, there is a struggle between clear inter-subject strategies that Negri and Hardt’s arguments tend to exclude.

This is followed by the discussion of Martin Shaw, who is known for his studies of globalization from a position close to Marxism, if not as close to Marxism¹¹. The theory of <Empire> is nothing but a minor cultural phenomenon with the same roots as the results of Marxism-centered continental philosophy in the study of international relations, and the only difference is that it is written in “decent” English. While Berkawi’s and Rafi’s arguments are reasonably valid, Hardt and Negri’s arguments for seeing current global power as more than just an “American empire” involve a more advanced view of the world than Berkawi and Rafi. Shaw then uses his own concepts of post-imperial and quasi-imperial¹² to depict the process by which imperialism is reorganized through post-imperialization or semi-empire.

In other words, until the beginning of the 20th century, international relations effectively meant inter-imperial relations. In the West, the Great Powers lost their power and established an imperial, but post-imperial order based on international decision-making, led by the United States, and in the East, the Soviet

10 Alex Callinicos, *The New Mandarines of American Power: The Bush Administration's Plans for the World*, Polity Press, 2003; id., “Toni Negri in Perspective”, Gopal Balakrishnan ed., *Debating Empire*, Verso, 2003, Ch.9.

11 Martin Shaw, *Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution*, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

12 This concept and his theories are discussed in Shaw, *ibid.* Ch.7 and in his 2002 paper “The Problem of the Quasi-Imperial State: Uses and Abuses of Anti-Imperialism in the Global Era” (<http://www.martinshaw.org/empire.htm> , last access 05/01/03). It is also confirmed from these documents that Shaw’s fundamental interest is quasi-imperial, not post-imperial.

Union established a semi-imperial order with the countries under its control, that is, ostensibly a sovereign state relationship but a de facto imperial relationship. In the post-Cold War period, these factors are being combined to form a post-imperial, international conglomerate of Western countries. The conglomerate respects values such as human rights and democracy and imperially intervenes in genocide and the war on terror. However, as the civil wars and ethnic conflicts that have occurred in the former Soviet Union, China, and many other Third World countries suggest, the formation of a semi-imperial order as a means of suppression of separatism and democratic demands, or (re)imperialization, can be seen at both the regional and national levels¹³. The theory of <Empire> refers to at most half of the aspects of “empire” that are occurring in the world, that is, the Western-centered conglomerate.

Finally, let us consider the argument of Walker, who is known for¹⁴ his discussion of postmodern IR or IR meta-theory¹⁵. Unlike the previous three, who criticize the disregard for “imperial” reality in the theory of <Empire>, Walker thoroughly exposes the methodological implications of the theory of <Empire>. The merits of <Empire> are, first, that it presents serious problems in thinking about the current world that mainstream theories of international relations have not adequately addressed, and second, Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari, Spinoza, Hobbes, Kelsen, Schmidt, Weber, etc., which are indispensable for any attempt at conceiving of world politics and world order. Thirdly, it is significant as a textbook or book guide on Marx and others, and thirdly, it is similar to Walker’s own long-standing assertion that international relations are not synonymous with world politics, and that world politics is composed of the interaction of international relations and external relations¹⁶.

On the other hand, the weakness of the theory of <Empire> is that, first of all, its thesis is old-fashioned and clichéd, and with the exception of the word empire and an update to the Marxist interpretation, most of the descriptions are confusing with the writings of normative theorists of the 1970s. The second and more central issue is how to deal with immanence.

The approach of <Empire> that separates sovereignty from the nation-state, sees sovereignty as a “problem” rather than as a preconceived concept is commendable. It simultaneously grasps the inside and outside of modern national sovereignty, and encompasses revolutions and counter-revolutions in modern history at the same time. However, Walker believes that the establishment of immanence based on modern reason and the ego through the humanistic revolutions of Descartes and Kant, as opposed to the transcendental philosophy that is concentrated in Christianity and Roman Catholicism in the early modern period, on which they rely, should also be regarded not as an “achievement” but as a “problem” as well as sovereignty. This is because the antagonistic relationship between immanence as a revolution against transcendentalism and sovereignty surrounding people as a counter-revolution against immanence is nothing less than the dualism that underpins modernity at its core.

In light of this dualism, the ontological claim according to which there is no outside in the “imperial” order, and everything is immanent, must also be questioned. Hardt and Negri confuse (1) the assertion that the modern mechanism of segmentation of the relationship between identity and difference in a political space based on territory is transforming into a different form than before, and (2) the assertion that the order has an intrinsic property to which nothing is external or other as an <Empire> regulating and controlling

13 Shaw refers to non-Western states as “the nation-state empire” when they become semi-imperial (Shaw, *ibid.*, p. 209). It can be said that this is exactly the opposite of what Benedict Anderson described as an empire that spreads official nationalism like its own skin and turns it into a nation-state.

14 R. B. J. Walker ed., *Inside / Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge University Press, 1992; Richard Falk, Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, and Walker eds., *Reframing the International: Law, Culture, Politics*, Routledge, 2002.

15 Lee Hansen, “R. B. J. Walker and International Relations: deconstructing a discipline”, Ole Waever and Iver B. Neumann ed., *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?*, Routledge, 1997, pp. 316-337.

16 Therefore, Walker appreciates chapters 1-2 of Part II in his discussion of Empire.

difference itself. The first argument is acceptable with some reservations, but that does not mean that the second argument is correct.

Hardt and Negri hold that the common claim according to which the attempt to transcend immanence by assuming the external itself causes aporia since it relies on the dualism of the inside and the outside. Therefore, they must have stood on the side of the immanence of <Empire>. But we cannot go outside of the internal-external dualism, nor can we go inward in the same way. Nevertheless, even if we conceive of the <Empire> order as having an immanence without an external body, internal and external problems will still remain within the "Empire"¹⁷. This makes it possible to criticize Negri and Hardt for the continuation of the "empire" within the <Empire> as the former three have done in common.

<Empire> marked the "end of politics" in the post-Cold War "end of history" situation, and was widely accepted for appealing to people's intuition in a situation where imbalances have widened under recent globalization and American unilateralism has come to light¹⁸. However, the narrative of internalization and the hegemony of the great powers, especially the United States, is a cliché in understanding current political life. They equate the transformation of sovereignty with the end of sovereignty, exploiting the flaws in Anglo-American studies of international relations and failing to analyze the issues and practices that are currently occurring in the world. Similar to Said's Orientalism, Empire reveals important areas of concern for the time being, in spite of, or even because of, its theoretical weaknesses. Berkawi and Rafi seek to incorporate the theory of empire into a sort of Anglo-American study of international relations. But what would be more useful, however, is to throw the study of international relations into the whole theoretical canvas that the theory of empire has depicted.

The Balance Sheet of the <Empire> Theory

From these comments, the following three points can be specified in relation to the theory of <Empire> and the study of international relations.

First, even those who have an intellectual base close to the theory of <Empire>, which is far from the typical orthodoxy of Anglo-American IRs, cannot accept the argument of <Empire> as it is. Nevertheless, in their case, because they share a common intellectual base, or because they have long been familiar with Negri's arguments, as can be seen in their refutation of the theory of the end of imperialism, there is a kind of incestuous effect that has led to a war of interpretation. This point should be discounted somewhat. In any case, as we will see in the next section, it should be noted that the theory of <Empire> is even more distant to mainstream international relations research, which is not so welcome before 9/11.

Second, the main criticisms of the theory of <Empire> are (1) the unwarranted neglect or disregard of the "imperial" reality, (2) the excessive emphasis on discontinuity in the interpretation of changes in times and circumstances, and (3) the theoretical and conceptual weakness of social science analysis as represented by the concept of multitudes. These points are the basis for the study of international relations as a field of social science, where it is difficult to get into the concept of <Empire> as an analytical concept as well as an ontology. However, it is doubtful whether the main focus of the theory of <Empire> was to construct an

17 Atsushi Sugita, "Politics," in Yuhiro Fukuda, Masanori Taniguchi, eds., *The Politics of Democracy*, University of Tokyo Press, 2002, pp. 92-109.

18 Regardless of how meaningful the comparison is, from its publication in March 2000 to March 2002, *Empire* sold 52,685 copies and was translated into 10 languages. In contrast, Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Relations*, published in 1999, Cambridge University Press, had sold only 5,760 copies, and the 75 volumes of the Cambridge University Press's International Relations Series (now about 10,000 copies) combined to sell about 160,000 copies (Barkawi and Laffey, "Retrieving the Imperial", p.109, n.2). Incidentally, the first edition in 1997 and the second edition in 2001 have sold more than 100,000 copies, including the first edition in 1997 and the second edition in 2001, which are popular textbooks (3rd edition of the book)

elaborate model as a theory of social science.

Thirdly, despite these shortcomings, it recognizes that <Empire> is a work that can contribute to the study of international relations. Particularly Barkawi, Rafi, and Walker, he gives high praise to the modern sovereign states and sovereign state systems of Western Europe for their depiction of the historically constructed and global expansion of colonialism and imperialism in relation to the non-Western world. Having said that, though, this point is rather a natural premise when looking at modern international relations from the perspective of the non-Western world¹⁹. In addition, as is well known, there are various other arguments about re-examining the Western-centric understanding of the formation of the modern world, and we should have reservations about seeing the essence of <Empire> in this point²⁰.

It is easy to criticize the theory of empire in a negative way. And, to borrow Inui Endo's words: "An argument that depicts the transition to 'Empire' only as one-way and finds resistance to it only on the same horizon - an opposition that finds only 'Empire' and multitude."²¹ The theory of <Empire> lacks a conceptual construction that is familiar to the social sciences in general. Not only that, but it is also clear from the discussion so far that it is inadequate as an argument for comprehensively presenting the world as a whole. After all, the theory of <Empire> is merely a 21st-century version of the Marxist movement theory based on the schema of "proletariat versus imperialism," and is it useless for international relations studies to try to deal with it seriously?

It is the author's position that it is not necessary to think that way. In the first place, if we accept the theory of <Empire> not as a dogma but as a naïve hypothesis (of course, we do not have to accept it, nor does it deny the option of not taking it), we can expand what we can learn from the argument by examining its validity. Regardless of whether this kind of borrowing competition is a way of taking in different fields, international relations studies have been conducted in the name of interdisciplinarity for a myriad of theories and research. In addition, there is room to evaluate the possibility of inclusion in the discussion, even if it does not inherit the argument itself. The existence of a flaw at the time of the first instance does not necessarily require the total abandonment of the perspective of the theory of empire.

So, what aspects of the <Empire> theory should be positively evaluated? In my view, one possibility for this is to view the theory of <Empire> as an attempt to challenge the totality and comprehensive understanding of the world, which has been neglected by many international relations studies. It is worth noting, as Walker points out, that the <Empire> theory presents an argument demonstrating "the inconsistency between international relations and world politics." In other words, it is commendable that the theory of <Empire> tackles the problem of how to describe this "world" as a whole, even though it contains too many or too few things.

Emphasis on this point may not necessarily be in line with the intentions of Hardt and Negri, who wrote the Theory of <Empire>. However, if we are to draw the flavor of the theory of <Empire> from the standpoint of international relations studies, one of the most attractive themes is the attempt to comprehensively describe the world as a whole. This is because the criticism that the entire "world" cannot be described as a whole is the same or more relevant to the study of international relations than the theory of <Empire>.²²

In this sense, Hardt and Negri, who have taken a kind of holistic approach to describe the world, and international relations research, which has tried to describe the world from a kind of atomistic approach that

19 Recent works include Yuichi Fujita, *Rivalry of Civilization in Asia*, Ochanomizu Shobo, 2001 and Shinichi Sato, *Intellectuals and Civilization in Modern China*, University of Tokyo Press, 1996.

20 Edward Keene, *Beyond Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism, and Order in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

21 Endo, *supra*, p. 68.

22 Steve Smith, "Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11", *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004), pp. 499-515.

starts from interstate relations, have fallen into the same trap. Therefore, bridging the “empire” theory of international relations studies, which starts from the parts, and Hardt and Negri’s theory of <Empire>, which starts from the whole, seems to lead researchers to the possibility of depicting this “world” as a whole in a mutually complementary manner. The task of this work is not to regard the “imperial” approach simply as an antithesis or alternative to the orthodox Western theory of international relations, but to grasp the whole picture of global relations, including international relations, as such, by integrating the holistic approach contained in the theory of <Empire> and the atomistic approach contained in the theory of “empire.”

As described above, the “imperial” approach is basically a comprehensive consideration of the world as a whole, including international relations. Nevertheless, it is incomplete in the sense that it proceeds with the discussion without necessarily encompassing the relationships that it is supposed to contain in an appropriate manner. On the other hand, the theory of “empire” from the perspective of international relations is basically developed from the perspective of bilateral relations. However, in the end, the theory of “empire” alone cannot encompass the entire world. In this way, the theory of <Empire> and the theory of “empire” can be imagined as intellectual endeavors, like digging a tunnel from both sides of a mountain, although the starting points of analysis are diametrically opposed. This creates room for bridging and considering <Empire> and “empire.”

3 “Empire” from the Perspective of International Politics

The debate on empire in mainstream international politics today is overwhelmingly that of American “empire.” This is in response to the fact that most of the policy theories on international relations, which also constitute the subject of research in international politics, are not “empires” but “empires” with the current United States in mind. In this mainstream theory of international politics, the theory of American <Empire> of Hardt and Negri is rarely mentioned. So, what is the theory of “empire” that international politics deals with? In this section, I will propose the characteristics of the theory of “empire” in international politics, relying on the organization of Yamamoto Yoshinobu’s “Theory of the International Politics of the Imperial System,” which is a definitive work that attempts to take a theoretical overview of the discourse of “empire” and the study of “empire”.²³

Informal Imperial System

According to Yamamoto’s thesis, there were two waves of imperial theory in international politics. The first is the debate represented by Rischka and others during the Vietnam War, and the second wave is the present one²⁴. Here, with regard to the first and second wave, he points out that “it can be said that none of the prominent traditional scholars of international politics have developed a (positive) theory of the American Empire,” which symbolically illustrates the relationship between the study of international relations and “empire” that I have already mentioned.

The definition of “empire” is complicated, but first of all, the imperial system that international politics deals with as a basic premise can be understood as a type of international system based on states. Second, based on the typology of the international system, the imperial system is a hierarchical international system. The hierarchical international system that has been discussed so far has been subject to the theory of dependence,

23 Yoshinobu Yamamoto, “The International Political Theory of the Imperial System,” *Journal of International Relations*, No. 22 (September 11004), No. 23 (March 2005), forthcoming. Unless otherwise noted, citations are from the same paper. For a large amount of literature on the theory of American empire, please refer to the bibliography of this paper.

24 Michael Cox, “The Empire’s Back in Town: Or America’s Imperial Temptation - Again”, *Millennium* 32-1(2003), pp. 1-27.

which deals with the economy as the center, the world system theory, and the hegemonic stability theory, addressing the military and security fields as the center. The imperial system, on the other hand, basically includes three dimensions at the same time: economic, military, and value. Therefore, the imperial system is a new analytical concept that differs from the existing hierarchical international system in the sense that it includes three elements: (1) the structure of (military) power, (2) the structure of the economy, and (3) the structure of values. The empire is the “guarantor of last resort” in security, the “lender of last resort” in the economy, and the “last judge and protector” in the value system.

Next, after synthesizing the arguments of the various houses, we will precipitate six types of international relations from the two perspectives of first, symmetry of influence, and second, objects of influence. In other words, if the object of influence is foreign policy, (1) the “balance of power” is when the influence is symmetrical, (2) the “hegemony” is when it is informally asymmetric, and (3) a formally asymmetrical case is considered to be an “autonomous territory,” (4) a symmetrical influence is considered to be an “interdependent empire,” (5) an asymmetrical influence is considered an “informal empire,” and (6) an asymmetrical influence is considered a “formal empire.” The informal imperial system of (5) is placed at the center of the discussion. This is because, as long as the logic of the official “table” in the current international system is a system of sovereign states, it is impossible for a formal empire to emerge at this time. In this sense, the imperial system can be said to be an “underlying logic” because it is informal.

Thus, the “imperial system” that Yamamoto aims at has a firstly informal character. In other words, it exerts substantially asymmetric influence on both the foreign and domestic policies of the other country, rather than through formal institutions. This argument about the informality of the current empire may be similar to the concept of quasi-empire in the aforementioned show. Second, it is a “subset of the hegemon.” In other words, if we limit ourselves to foreign policy, the hegemon and the empire are interchangeable, and at the same time, a country sometimes acts as an empire and is involved in domestic affairs, and sometimes it acts only as a hegemon. Furthermore, if the actions of a state in such a position are premised on a certain level of consensus, it is considered “imperial” (“hegemonic” if it is only foreign policy), and “imperialistic” (“hegemonic” if it is only foreign policy).

The internal character of the imperial system is (1) the degree of stratification in the substructure, (2) the presence or absence of asymmetric influence exercises, and (3) the structure of relations in the superstructure (hub-spoke system)²⁵. There are numerous variations depending on the degree of (see Table 2). If all three elements are present, it is a typical imperial system. If there is no hub-and-spoke system of the three elements, it is a weak imperial system like the U.S.-European relationship. If there is no hub-and-spoke system and asymmetry among the three elements, it is a “unipolar system without hegemony” that is cautious about engaging with other countries. And if all three of these elements do not exist, it is no longer an imperial system. In addition, even though it is called hierarchical, it actually has a concentric structure. Thus, the hub-spoke system is formed based on a concentric hierarchical structure, but it is not always formed.

The informal imperial system has always had this fluidity, but its structure is also fluid and difficult to determine. If the current imperial system is informal, then the current formal international system is a sovereign state system, and the two coexist. The sovereign state system is endowed with the function of checking the “underlying logic” of the imperial system, but at the same time, the informal imperial system proves to be complementary to the sovereign state system. However, the informal imperial system can exacerbate anarchy and destabilize the system of sovereign states.

Empires excel in military, economic, and value excellence, and the qualities that underpin such excellence include (1) a universal state system, (2) the ability to promote and manage transnationality, and (3) the presence of strong political institutions. The empire seeks legitimacy from within itself and from within

25 It is generally referred to as a hub-and-spoke method. That is, it refers to a structure in which there are multiple peripherals and one center, there is no connection between the periphery, and there is a path only between the periphery and the center.

the imperial system, and while trying to reconcile the interests of the imperial system with its own national interests, it implements policies such as integration, promotion of transformation, opposition, cooperation, and direct rule (including the forced transplantation of the political system) against the concentric substructure, depending on the opponent²⁶. The empire carries²⁷ out its policies by adopting a triple standard, so to speak, according to what Cooper and Akihiko Tanaka call the three spheres (center, semi-periphery, and periphery).

Within an empire, there are (1) constraints that arise when the interests of the empire conflict with the interests of the country, (2) constraints that arise from the interdependence between the empire and countries sharing a value system, and (3) constraints arising in the country that is asked for support when the empire requests support from another country in order to take action against a country with different interests. On the other hand, the empire itself seeks to gain international legitimacy through (1) the provision of temporal benefits such as economic benefits and security, (2) the value norms inherited by the empire, and (3) the procedure of consensus based on a multifaceted framework such as a universal international system centered on the United Nations and an international system centered on resistance. The above structure represents the general framework of the "empire" in the second wave from the perspective of international politics in Yamamoto's thesis, that is, the informal imperial system.

Yamamoto's thesis then examines (1) the process of creation, development, decline, and collapse of the imperial system, and (2) the multi-imperial system, the competing imperial system, and the single imperial system as a type of imperial system.

To summarize very simply, the imperial system is not the result of a deliberate design, but a result of a complex intertwining of domestic, perimperial, and international systems. Furthermore, the process of its transformation is likewise not determined by unique factors. Based on a comparison with the multi-empire system and the competing imperial system typified by the Cold War structure, which was common in the pre-Cold War world, the current system of a single empire with the United States in mind can be characterized as follows: (1) ideologies and value systems are homogeneous and hierarchical, (2) military power is mainly used to maintain order within the imperial system and to suppress potential competitors, and (3) alliances in the central bloc are formed on the premise of shared values, the purpose is to maintain regional equilibrium, and coalitions are formed according to the situation, (4) diplomacy is for the purpose of management and coordination, (5) the periphery is an object of values and market economy infiltrated and at the same time a source of security as a source of threat, (6) terrorism becomes a problem in relations with non-state groups, and (7) The actions of the empire would be controlled by the empire's own prudence, the principle of sovereign equality, and international organizations.

In Part 4, the paper examines the history of the American imperial system, and in the concluding remarks, it also discusses the state of the imperial system and the international system in the present and future.

The formation of the U.S. imperial system "took the path of first becoming an economically powerful country, then establishing a state system capable of mobilizing its economic resources, then strengthening its military power, and finally actively democratizing the world by defending liberal values (democracy)." In the post-Cold War period, the question of how to use force became an issue as the unipolar structure became clearer, and after 9/11, one of the options for action that had been in place for some time, such as the "forced transplantation of democracy" as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, seems to be on full display.

The current international system can be defined as an informal imperial system of the United States, but

26 This area is reminiscent of the Chinese order, which had a complex governing principle of central, regional, doji, feudal vassals, tributary, and reciprocal cities (Takeshi Hamashita, "East Asian International System," in Sada Ariga, Shigeaki Uno, Kiri Kido, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, Akio Watanabe, eds., *Lecture on International Politics 1: Theory of International Politics*, University of Tokyo Press, 1989, Chapter 2). By applying this schema to the American "empire," it also shows a way to grasp the "empire" order without dividing it into domestic and international politics.

27 Akihiko Tanaka, "New 'Middle Ages'," *Japan Keizai Shimbun*, 1996 (expanded paperback edition 2003).

given the conflict between Europe and the United States, it can also be regarded as a “doughnut-shaped” system that is not an empire in the central sphere. However, it is not only the informal imperial system that exists today, and it is not only the sovereign state system that coexists with the imperial system. Relying on Kaplan’s classification of international systems²⁸, the current international system consists of (1) an imperial system as a subsystem of hegemony, (2) a multipolar or bipolar system composed of sovereign states, (3) a universal system that is an extension of the United Nations based on the premise of sharing and observing rules, and (4) the understanding of the paper is that transnational global societies manifest themselves with deviations from region to region and situation to situation, causing interactions.

The Balance Sheet of the “Empire” Theory

Yamamoto’s thesis sets it apart from the so-called “empire” and “empire theory” theories and provides a comprehensive perspective on how to treat the concept of empire from an academic perspective. As such, it is an extremely effective framework for objectively classifying and understanding the image of “empire” on which those who argue for an “(American) empire” rely in regard of the premise of some subjective (and sometimes overtly political) implications²⁹.

This paper, which can be said to be the greatest common denominator of understanding “empire” in international politics, reveals several characteristics of the attempt to examine the state of the “empire” order from the perspective of international politics.

First, when international politics deals with the imperial system, it is primarily understood as a type of international system. As Yamamoto points out, the “theory of international politics of the imperial system” is a kind of semantic contradiction, and the question arises of how to deal with the relationship between “empire” and the “international (or sovereign state system)” order. The concept of an informal empire is set up for this purpose, but at the same time, the current “world” cannot be recovered as a mere “international” or an “empire” in the classical sense, so to speak. It also suggests that it operates by a mechanism that is open to multilayered non-determinism. If we are to deal with this problem within the framework of the mainstream paradigm of international politics, it is healthy to suppress the imperial in a way that does not completely betray the constraints of “international.” However, if we look at the world from the perspective of understanding it as a whole, there are reservations about the extent to which it can be maintained by expanding the perspective from the international system.

Second, the Imperial System is understood as a “subset” of the hegemonic system. This is basically the same stance that mainstream international politics takes to understand globalization as an extension of the theory of interdependence³⁰, and it is a path that can be affirmed when considering the process of academic development. However, if we assume a doughnut-shaped system, it is not impossible to think of the hegemonic system as a subset of the imperial system. Furthermore, if “empire” is considered as a subset of <Empire>, the world can be explained in terms of a three-tiered structure of hegemony, <Empire>, and “empire”. To examine this issue further, it is necessary to have a methodological discussion of the relationship between analysis and synthesis, or between reductionism and holism, which is included in the idea of extending bilateral relations from the analysis of bilateral relations to the system level, as Yamamoto carefully reserves.

28 Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*, John Wiley, 1957.

29 Michael Cox, “Empire, imperialism and the Bush doctrine”, *Review of International Studies* 30(2004), pp. 585-608, G. John Ikenberry, “Liberalism and empire: logics of order in the American unipolar age”, *ibid.*, pp. 609-630, Michael Mann, “The first empire of the 21st century”, *ibid.*, pp. 631-653.

30 Yoshinobu Yamamoto, “Globalization and Change in the International System”, *Japan Review of International Affairs* 15-2 (Summer 2001), pp.87-105. Robert Keohane, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World*, Routledge, 2002.

Thirdly, I would like to discuss the approach that seeks to understand the characteristics of the imperial system from the three systems of military, economic, and value. In the sense that this is the construction of a new framework that adds elements of value to the existing international system theory, such as the overemphasis on security in the theory of hegemonic stability and the emphasis on the economy in the theory of the world system, it can be evaluated as an achievement of intellectual contribution in seizing the opportunity for the development of academic analytical concepts implied by the "imperial" discourse that is widely exchanged in the streets. On the other hand, this is due to the exclusion or neglect of identity and culture in mainstream international politics, according to Ruggie's previous formulation of "neo-utilitarianism,"³¹ or the mere explanatory variation of the changes that a considerable part of subsequent constructivism tends to fall into, which is the trend of artificial elaboration as³² <Empire>. It is also an interesting subject in terms of how it can be applied to analysis.

The question of the introduction of values (culture) in the system-level analysis of international politics can be discussed from yet another direction. This is because, although it is not necessary to explain this, the analysis of "empire" and "imperialism" in the classical sense has taken into account elements of value or culture in the first place, and this is the same in the way³³ of approaching ancient and modern studies. For example, if one glances at the American studies that the current theory of "empire" has in mind, it will be easy to understand. The importance that the United States has placed on the sharing and propagation of values, and the enormous impact that this has had on domestic and foreign policy, has been pointed out by the fundamental achievements of American political and diplomatic history³⁴. In addition, this point has always been emphasized in various studies on the foreign cultural policy of the United States and the various cultural influences of the so-called critical approach of cultural imperialism, which have been rarely emphasized in international politics³⁵.

Of course, the treatment of values should not be uniquely relegated to cultural reductionism or cultural determinism. On the other hand, Krasner's way of distinguishing between the logic of role suitability and the logic of rational choice, and making it seem that the latter is superior in the international community, so to speak,³⁶ cannot escape the slander of simplification. There is a difference between acquiring simplicity and explanatory capacity as a hypothesis and explaining the complexity of the value or cultural issues in real international relations.

31 John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge", *International Organization* 52-4, Autumn 1998, pp. 855-885.

32 In this regard, see Smith, Op. Cit.

33 In addition to the various essays included in this book, representative works include Yuzo Yamamoto, ed., *The Study of Empire*, Nagoya University Press, 2003. Masayuki Yamauchi, *Empire and Nation*, Iwanami Shoten, 2004, Edward W. Said, translated by Yoichi Ohashi, *Culture and Imperialism*, Misuzu Shobo, 1998-2001, Michael W. Doyle, *Empires*, Cornell University Press, 1986. At the same time, Doyle published a paper that became the source of the so-called theory of democratic peace ("Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs", Part I & II, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (1983), pp. 205-253 and 323-353.). It is worth examining how Doyle's analysis of empire and the analysis of the question of values in international politics were connected, and how it developed within the framework of international politics.

34 Makoto Saito, *History of American Politics and Diplomacy*, University of Tokyo Press, 1975, *What is America?*, Heibonsha Library, 1991. Shun Furuya, *Americanism*, University of Tokyo Press, 2001. Ibid., *America: Between the Past and the Present*, Iwanami Shinsho, 2004.

35 Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, "Shame on US? Academics, Cultural Transfer, and the Cold War: A Critical Review", *Diplomatic History*, 24-3(2000), pp.465-494.

36 Stephan Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton University Press, 1999.

4 “International” and <International>, “empire” and <Empire>

What emerges from the above arrangement is the problem of the divergence between the identification of “the world” and “international” and “empire”. While the theory of <Empire> attempts to describe the totality of the world while leaving some inadequacies, the theory of “empire” starts from “international” and only juxtaposes the “empire” system with various other systems when describing the totality of the world. This point can be further clarified by, for example, a comparison of the “complex three-dimensional chess game” theory, which Joseph Nye often cites as the current state of the world, with the theory of “empire” and the theory of <Empire>.³⁷

As is well known, Nye argues that (1) the unipolar structure of the United States in terms of military power in the political-military problem area (issue), (2) the multipolar structure centered on Japan, the United States, and Europe in economic power in the economic problem area, and (3) transnational relations, which are mainly composed of a wide variety of non-state actors, play an important role. It has the following configuration. An interesting point about Nye’s argument is that³⁸, despite the fact that he presented the classification of issues or types of forces (1) and (2), (3) is not based on the type of force, but on the mode of relations or the difference in subjects. Moreover, as far as the theory of soft power, which is another axis of Nye’s argument, is concerned, he considers three types of power: military power, economic power, and soft power³⁹, but of course soft power does not correspond only to (3).

On the other hand, Yamamoto’s world structure of (1) an informal empire, (2) a system of sovereign states, (3) a universal system, and (4) a national global society classifies the world based on the mode of the international system, not the type of power, and a universal system that is not in Nye will be added to it. However, the classification criteria are still different between (1) - (3) and (4). This coexistence of logically inconsistent categories, which in a sense reminds me of the Borges texts quoted by Foucault⁴⁰, is based on the fact that the world structure that starts from the “international relations” on which much of the current mainstream international relations research relies is the “world” as a whole, but it is not possible to create a “world” as a whole by the tools at hand. It can be said that it clearly shows to the impossibility of accurately representing the thing itself. If we start from international relations in the sense of interstate relations, it may have once been appropriate as an expression of the totality of the world without any problems, but as long as it starts from interstate relations, it is difficult to positively present a comprehensive world structure that encompasses transnational forces in a non-superfluous form.

However, it is difficult to say that the world structure presented by Negri and Hardt’s theory of empire also avoids these problems. Negri and Hardt identify three aspects of the governance of the empire: (1) a monarchy centered on the military aspect, (2) an aristocracy centered on the economic aspect, and (3) a democracy centered on the United Nations General Assembly and NGOs⁴¹. Add to that the argument according to which

37 Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the world’s only superpower can’t go it alone*, Oxford University Press, 2002, Ch.1.

38 Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Understanding International Conflict*, 3rd edition, 1999.

39 Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The means to success in world politics*, Public Affairs, 2004, Ch.1. For an analysis of the concept of soft power itself, see the author’s presentation at the 9th International Joint Seminar of the International Association and Public Policy, “International Relations as a Phenomenon of International Relations” (January 15, 2004, Department of International Social Sciences, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo, <http://www.kiss.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/icpp-js.html>).

40 Translated by Michel Foucault, Kazumin Watanabe, and Akira Sasaki, *Words and Things*, translated by Shinchosha, 1974, pp. 13-14.

41 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Harvard University Press, 2000. (translated by Kazunori Mizushima, Takashi Sakai, Kunihiro Hama, Toshimi Yoshida, <Empire> (Ibunsha, 2003), Part 3, 35, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, “Globalization and Democracy”, translated by Koichi Ohara, and Akira Yoshizawa, *Five Lectures on ‘Empire’*, Seidosha,

the Multitude must act as a counter-power to the Empire and establish a global absolute democracy is added to the equation, and the scheme of their world structure is formed.

As Yamamoto points out, there are similarities, at least on the surface, between the world structure of an informal empire, a system of sovereign states, and a universal system, and the world structure of Negri, which consists of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, regardless of their implications. On the other hand, when it comes to global society and multitude, the former, like Nye, does not go beyond the superfluous treatment of the international system classification, while the latter is positioned in a way that clearly states its relationship with the order as both an object of domination and an object of liberation, as the "flesh" of "life" that opposes <Empire>, an entity that is neither a people that transcends the boundaries of a single country nor an unorganized crowd.

However, as we have seen in the criticisms of Callinikos and others, multitude as a concept contains many aspects that cannot be said to be rooted in the reality of the subject in global society as an analytical concept. In this sense, it must be contended that Zoro's criticism according to which multitude is no more than an imaginary product of Negri's Wishful Thinking is "the fading sinopia of the eighteenth-century proletariat" and "a class that Marx has elevated to the demiurge of history."⁴² In their new book, *Multitude*, they attempt to refute various criticisms, but their rebuttals do not overturn Zoro's point that the ⁴³concept of multitude "does not provide an analytical definition that would help the reader locate this collective subject in a particular sociopolitical context."⁴⁴

Multitude is associated with the Empire as a fundamental resistant, whether implicit or explicit, and there is a lack of consideration for the ambivalence or indeterminacy of its existence. Even in transnational societies, there must be entities that contribute to the strengthening of the "imperial" or "imperial" order on a winning horse. In the first place, it is difficult to say that the entire "world" was constituted without taking into account the fact that *Les Misérables*, who are unable to actively resist or cooperate, make up the overwhelming majority of the population on this planet⁴⁵.

In addition, we must take into account not only those who freely move around the globe and exercise opposing power, as in the case of Multitude, but also the many people who have been increasingly deprived of their independence by globalization and who seek peace of mind by voluntarily delegating their independence, just like Dostoevsky's "Grand Inquisitor"⁴⁶. This is especially true if the "imperial" sovereignty seeks to strengthen the web of global surveillance and discipline at various levels. In light of this constellation, multitude is one of the useful concepts when analyzing the area that can be grouped with transnational relations. In other words, for the time being, it is appropriate to position it as one of the various tendencies of the forces that exist in the transnational global society and the phase that Mr. Nye and Mr. Yamamoto call transnational relations.

Then, in representing the world as a whole, is it not possible to comprehensively grasp transnational relations and multitudes in relation to the two theories of empire? In order to think about this, let us introduce

2003, pp. 119-142.

42 Negri, Danilo Zorlo, "Dialogue on 'Empire'," Negri, *Ibid.*, pp. 46-48.

43 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, "Excursus 2. Organization: Multitude on the Left", *Multitude: War and Democracy in the age of Empire*, Penguin Press, 2004, pp. 219-227.

44 Negri, Zorro, *supra*, p. 46.

45 As a critique from a similar point of view, see Endo, *supra*, p. 80.

46 Dostoevsky, translated by Takuya Hara, *The Brothers Karamazov*, Shincho Bunko, first volume. In recent years, the "Grand Inquisitor" has often been mentioned in connection with the issue of child abuse, but from the standpoint of international relations research, it should be noted that Dostoevsky entrusted the issue of freedom and slavery to the elder Zosima in that he also discusses the issue of freedom and slavery from the perspective of the increase in freedom and the unity of the global world as a whole (*Ibid.*, middle volume, pp. 99~100).

the concept of “international” as a prototype⁴⁷. “International” is a view that includes “international” centered on relations between states, and considers international relations as international relations that occur across national borders through the activities of various actors. In other words, “international” is a perspective that considers how all things that move across borders (this term is used with the Hiromatsu connotation in mind, but traditionally they can be called “people, goods, money, and information”) affect and change all the things that exist across borders and the relationships between them.

What is the relationship between this “international” and the “empire”? In order to understand this, we will postulate two distinctions, which are very tentative: politics / relations and international / world or global.

First of all, politics refers to politics in a narrow sense that can be distinguished from economy, society, culture, etc. for the time being. On the other hand, relations include politics and refer to politics in a broad sense or politics of relationships that attempts to capture the complexity and ambiguity of various relationships themselves.

Next, “international” refers to the perspective of “internationality,” which seeks to consider international relations relatively independently without necessarily associating them with a description of the totality of the world. On the other hand, world or global includes international and refers to the perspective of “the world (global)” that seeks to describe the totality of the world more comprehensively and more accurately. Based on these two distinctions, the relationship between the two internationals and the two empires is as follows (Table 3).

| | politics | relations |
|------------------------|---|--|
| international | traditional ir=“international” | broadened ir=<international> |
| world or global | world/global politics=intersectionality between “international’ and “empire” | world/global relations=intersectionality between <international> and <Empire> |

Table 1: “international” and “empire”, <international> and <Empire>

First, the quadrant of international/politics is traditional international politics, and “international” occupies a stable position here. Second, the international/relations quadrant is a theory of international relations in that it deals with all international relations. “International” occupies that position. In the past, there was little or little awareness of the existence of international and world or global, so the divergence between the two was not much of a problem. Today, however, it has become more accurate to be sensitive to this discrepancy as a way of perceiving the world.

Third, the quadrant of world or global / politics is a view of the world as a whole in line with politics in a narrow sense, where “international” and “imperial” communicate with each other with some overlap. Fourth, the quadrant of world or global / relations is an area that attempts to comprehensively describe the world as a whole by the politics of relations, including politics in a narrow sense. In this area, it seems possible to get closer to the essence of the current world structure by meshing the “empire” that starts more holistically and the “international” that starts more atomistically. If, rather than confining the theory of “empire” (and the theory of <Empire>) to the existing field of international relations studies, we should take on the intellectual challenges it presents academically and respond head-on. Isn’t it possible to construct a world where “international” and “empire” intersect, or a theory of global relations?

47 Atsushi Shibasaki, “Two Cultures in International Cultural Theory,” *International Politics*, No. 129 (February 2002).

Conclusion

This chapter organizes the perception and treatment of the theories of <Empire> and “empire” in the study of international relations, and in a sense, the ultimate goal of academia is to provide a comprehensive or unified understanding of the “world” as a whole.⁴⁸ We have clarified what kind of strengths, disadvantages, and challenges it has. However, there are many aspects of such an argument that cannot escape the slander of “begging for something that does not exist” for researchers in both fields.

Nevertheless, I have dared to discuss the issue from the perspective of the totality of the world, because one of the social roles of the study of international relations is ultimately to comprehensively grasp the entire global society and answer the question, “What is this world?”. Or, if future research on international relations takes the position of methodological pluralism⁴⁹, it should be included in the establishment of a field of research that directly examines the “world” as a whole.

As Shozo Omori once stated, “the essence of scientific explanation does not lie in the logical deduction from theory, but in the fact that it is replaced by a coarser description of the facts by a better depiction of the facts.”⁵⁰ In other words, the theoretical explanation of science is “a depiction of the ‘facts,’ which is by no means an explanation of the contraptions of facts by constructing unknown theoretical concepts or extreme concepts.”⁵¹ Posing the above questions is nothing more than seeking a better depiction of the “actuality” of the world. Although this is an extremely challenging task, it is difficult to argue that current international relations studies have a research area that directly focuses on this question. Both the <Empire> and “Empire” theories are concerned with the question “What is this world?”, but they seem to have only half-heartedly reached the search for world understanding because they try to maintain consistency from their respective standpoints. If one of the challenges of international relations is how to explain the world as a whole, it would not be unfair to use the theory of <Empire> and the theory of “empire” as clues to approach this question.

This interest in issues is suggested by Japan’s understanding of classical international relations theory.

By the way, I am starting to wonder about the word “international relations.” In other words, the Japanese word “international” is a translation of international, and therefore there is a suspicion that it is an adjective that originally means the relationship between countries. The etymology of the word is exactly the same. However, if you read the text, you will understand that the “international relations” that we observe are by no means limited to relations between states. In other words, he observes all the world-wide problems and people-level phenomena that transcend the national dimension. Therefore, while keeping within our field of vision all the social phenomena that arise in the international community and the world community, or at least striving to contain them. I want to do research. Again, our research interests happen to be historically referred to as “international relations,” but they are by no means limited to the strictly defined definition of “international relations.” It does not matter whether it is called a global problem or a global issue, but it should be understood that it covers a part or a whole of social phenomena that occur on an international and global scale beyond the boundaries of countries⁵².

48 Hiroyuki Yoshikawa, *Techno Globe*, Industry Research Committee, 1993.

49 Smith, Op. cit.; Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon, “The Study of international relations in Japan: towards a more international discipline”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 1-1(2001), pp. 1-20.

50 Sozo Omori, “The Topography of Science and Philosophy,” Sozo Omori, *Things and Minds*, University of Tokyo Press, 1976 (first published in 1968), p. 23.

51 Ditto.

52 Kankichi Eto, Akio Watanabe, Shunpei Kumon, Kenichiro Hirano, *International Relations*, University of Tokyo Press, 1982, p. V.

By the end of the 20th century, this idea of interdisciplinary international relations had already become a formality in the face of the explosive complexity of society and the rapid development of specialized specialization. However, the complexity of modern society and scholarship to such an extent that it is physically impossible for a single person to acquire various disciplines with the same density and depth does not mean that it has become impossible to consider the global relations occurring on this earth (which in reality already includes parts of the universe) as a whole.

The theory of empire is also one of the intellectual phenomena brought about by globalization, which is the expression of the consciousness that the whole world is one. One effective way to develop international relations research is to analyze it analytically, and to open up a consideration of the “world” itself in relation to the theory of <Empire>, as well to create research that can be called “global relations.”

Chapter 5

The Westphalian Discourse and The Study of International Relations

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the relationship between the Westphalian view of history and the study of international relations. To commence with, Westphalia’s view of history and international relations are defined as follows.

The Westphalian view of history is a historical recognition that since the “Peace of Westphalia” in 1648, modern international relations in the sense of relations between sovereign states have been established in Europe, and the modern international community has expanded to the size of the earth. This understanding of history consists of two parts: (1) the recognition of the “birthday” of modern international relations, and the second recognition of the events from the “birthday” to the present. Hereinafter, these are referred to as “first recognition” and “second awareness” respectively. Thus, the Westphalian view of history is that the international order established in Europe is the origin of the current international system, and that its origin date is 1648.

In a broad sense, international relations studies refer to all academic disciplines that study “international relations,” and this chapter examines the relationship between International Relations (IR) and Westphalian history as the greatest common denominator of the academic field in the English-speaking world. As is well known, there is a lot of debate about the meaning of the term “international relations” and the definition of international relations, but I will not go into this issue here. Against said background, this chapter focuses on how Westphalia’s view of history has influenced the historiography of IR as an academic discipline. The history of international relations is the sum total of the history of “theories,” “theories,” and “ideas” in international relations, and is used as a concept that takes a bird’s-eye view of the emergence and development of various theories and ideas as a whole, rather than the theoretical formation and development of individual theories and ideas. The relationship between the two is not unidirectional, but rather a relationship in which both sides refer to and refer to each other, so strictly speaking, it describes the bidirectional relationship of mutual influence.

This book (Part I) examines how the Westphalian view of history has influenced the history of the world as a reality, or the history of international relations, and at the same time examines how the Westphalian view of history has influenced the theory of international relations, which is an academic device that seeks to recognize, understand, and explain reality. If we tentatively refer to the former as a broad view of Westphalian history and to the latter as a narrowly defined view of Westphalian history, this chapter is a discussion of the narrowly defined view of Westphalian history.

This chapter is organized as follows: section 1 discusses the analytical premise of how to think about the “mythology” of Westphalian view of history, while evaluating the attempts to “deconstruct” in previous studies. Section 2 examines the relationship between the Westphalian view of history and the theory of international relations, examines the fact that existing criticisms of the Westphalian view of history have not actually reached the point of relativizing the Westphalian view of history, based on the structural problems of the academic discipline of international relations, and discuss the relationship between the Westphalian view of history and the three centralisms that form the core premise of international relations theory.

Section 3 argues that the history of international relations theory, which is based on the common premise of the three centralisms, is in fact nothing more than a history of deviations in evaluating common academic premises, contrary to apparent diversity and irreconcilability, and that the Westphalian view of history functions as if to provide historical evidence for such academic cores. It is further argued that the academic core of international relations has been self-propelled in a way that is detached from historical premises. Finally, in the “Conclusion,” I summarize the discussion and show that in order to obtain a post-Westphalian view of history, it is insufficient to consider the Westphalian view of history in a narrow sense within the theory of international relations, but it is necessary to examine the historical relationship with the Westphalian view of history in a broad sense.

1. Myths in A Discipline

In analyzing the discussion of Westphalian view of history, the following three points must be taken into account. The first is what exactly the Westphalian view of history as a “view of history” is about. Specifically, this includes views on two levels: the first level is the opinion on the findings and interpretation of facts related to the fact that “the modern Western international system was established by the Treaty of Westphalia.” The second level is the view on the interpretation of the entire history of the “modern Western international system” in accordance with the findings of fact, that is, the history of the modern Western international system is understood before and after the Treaty of Westphalia, not before or after it. Regardless of the content of a historical fact, it is considered to be less significant as a turning point in history than the Treaty of Westphalia, the establishment of the Treaty of Westphalia is understood as if it were the pinnacle of change, and the subsequent history is to be understood in terms of the changes and effects that occurred in the Treaty of Westphalia. This chapter mainly analyzes discussions at the first level.

Second, there are two ways to criticize, deny, or overturn Westphalian view of history. First, the direct goal would be to revise the understanding, evaluation, and interpretation of certain historical facts themselves, or to revise the systematic interpretation of history that arises from that interpretation. It is, so to speak, a “weak demythologizing”. Second, it is conceivable that the existence of a fact itself is not taken as self-evident in the first place. This is, so to speak, a “strong demythologization.” What the “myth” disruptors are trying to do in this chapter is basically the first act of demythologizing.

Third, why, among whom, and how did the “Westphalian view of history” come to be circulated and established? This is because, even if a revision of facts or historical views is pressed, it is not the same as the correction being automatically circulated and adopted. This is problematic because the study of international relations does not necessarily have the property of being able to “progress” in a linear and universally manner according to the methodological approach peculiar to mathematics, physics, and chemistry. In this chapter, the flow of international relations among researchers is the main subject of consideration. The process of distribution and establishment in a wider range, including before the establishment of international relations theory, will be dealt with in Chapter 2 and below.

(1) We fang it! The Logic of ‘Myth-busters’

As is well known, many indications have already been made that the Westphalian view of history is simply inaccurate as a historical fact. In the following, I will mention Teschke and Kinji Akashi as representative myths.

Theschke’s argument for demythologizing did not place the Treaty of Westphalia as the starting point for the formation of the modern state system, but rather the process of capitalism and the formation of the modern state in England in the second half of the 17th century⁵³.

In short, the highly dynamic nature of the Westphalian order was a far cry from its modern successors. Its characteristic forms of goods, combined with the persistence of non-capitalist property relations, impeded the development of modern sovereign states. The IR’s failure to accurately theorize and date “1648” is that it confuses absolutist sovereign states with modern sovereign states. As a result, solving the mystery of Westphalia requires a re-theorizing of absolutist sovereign states⁵⁴.

From this standpoint, Teschke focuses on the formation and change of the aspect of property relations, proves that the sovereign state at the time of the Treaty of Westphalia is not a “modern” sovereign state in the full sense of the word, and finds its origins in the transition from absolutism to capitalism, and from dynastic sovereign states to parliamentary sovereign states. In other words, “the decisive transition to modern international relations was not marked by the Treaty of Westphalia, but was founded by the advent of the first modern state, i.e., post-revolutionary England,” and that the modern international system was born through a series of processes after 1688, especially the “long transitional period” from the French Revolution to the end of World War I⁵⁵.

Theschke’s argument consisted in theoretically and empirically maintaining that modernity can be understood in a different way by redrawing the line between the first and second cognitions. However, in the case of Teshke, he only points out that myths are false, and does not consider the aforementioned process of distribution and consolidation, that is, how the myth came to circulate and function in the study of international relations, and why.

Subsequently, Kinji Akashi’s in-depth empirical research⁵⁶ attempts to demythologize from the standpoint of the history of international law. Akashi defines myths as “things that are understood as ‘common understanding’ by the overwhelming majority of researchers in the field of study for an evaluation of a certain historical event, but sometimes continue to pass without any (re)verification.”⁵⁷ It is prescribed. In Akashi, the “Westphalian myth” is “the perception of current scholars of international law that modern international law began with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648”⁵⁸ and that “the Treaty of Westphalia established modern relations between states.”⁵⁹ That is what it means. Therefore, Akashi examines the Treaty of Westphalia in detail, both from the results of German legal history and legal history and from its references in the history of international law. As a result, he argues that the Treaty of Westphalia was “mythed” by Wheaton’s French edition of *The History of European International Law* (1841) and the English edition of *The History of Western International Law* (1845), which were influenced by Koch’s history of treaties.

53 Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations*, Verso, 2003.

54 Ibid., p. 329.

55 Ibid., pp. 336-337.

56 Kinji Akashi, *The Treaty of Westphalia: Myth and Reality*, Keio University Press, 2009.

57 Ibid., p. 3.

58 Ibid., p. 4.

59 Ibid., p. 537.

In this way, the “Westphalian Myth” was created in the middle of the nineteenth century with Wheaton’s writings as a decisive trigger, and the intellectual soil for its birth was created in the eighteenth century. In other words, from the immediate aftermath of the creation of the Treaty of Westphalia until the eighteenth century, the general understanding was that the Treaty had no special significance in international law or in European relations (as a rabbit horn in imperial terms). And said understanding is correct if we read the treaty in its entirety. The “myth” is false, and is a figment of the imagination of the post-establishment of the modern system of sovereign states in Europe after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire⁶⁰.

Akashi’s approach captures the process of myth creation from two perspectives: the contemporary significance of the treaty itself, and the change in the significance of the treaty by later scholars of international law, national legal history, and national political history. In this sense, it can be considered that the first and third points are being actively advocated. However, even if it is clarified that it is a myth, there is not enough consideration for the second point, which is what kind of effect and function the myth brings to the study of international relations. As for the third distribution, while it can be said that it has made a significant contribution to the identification of the process of the emergence of myths in international jurisprudence, it does not fully delve into how the concept was popularized and why this “imaginary product” has continued to circulate and function as a myth.

In addition to this, the mythical nature of the Westphalian view of history as a historical fact in international relations has been illustrated and pointed out by many studies such as Osiander and Ruggie⁶¹. Regarding the distribution process within international relations theory, for example, Leo Gross’s paper in 1948 cited Osiander as the source of the paper⁶², and Sebastian Schmidt cited Richard Falk’s paper in 1969 as a paper that had a significant impact on distribution after Gross.⁶³ In addition, there are those who harshly criticize the relationship between the establishment of the historical view and Western-centrism⁶⁴. In the future, it will be necessary to empirically follow the process of the emergence and introduction of this myth within the theory of international relations, as well as⁶⁵ the process of its distribution and dissemination as a “global message game.” The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the basic assumptions that must be considered before doing so.

The points made by Osiander and Schmidt themselves contain a number of points that need to be re-examined, and further detailed elucidation of the distribution process is a task for the future, including the author. In any case, the fact that the Westphalian view of history is a “myth” cannot be denied in the grand scheme of things, and its origins have already become clear to the extent that we can obtain clues to elucidate the distribution process within the study of international relations, including the reference to Wheaton in Akashi.

However, the fact that it is largely denied is not the conclusion of the discussion in this chapter, but rather

60 Ibid., p. 510.

61 Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” *International Organization*, 55, no. 2, 2001, pp. 251–287; John Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” *International Organization*, 46, no.1, pp. 139–174.

62 Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948,” *American Journal of International Law*, 42, 1948, no.1, pp.20–41.

63 Sebastian Schmidt, “To Order the Minds of Scholars: The discourse of the Peace of Westphalia in International Relations Literature,” *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no.3, 2011, pp. 601–623; Richard Falk, “The Interplay of Westphalia and Hardtner Conceptions of the International Legal Order,” in: Falk and Cyril E. Black eds., *The Future of the International Legal Order*, Princeton University Press, 1969, pp. 32–70.

64 Turan Kayaoglu, “Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory,” *International Studies Review* 12, no.2, 2010, pp.193–217.

65 Dr. Shibasaki, “The Human View of International Relations: The International Theory of ‘Fear,’” edited by Kenichiro Hirano et al. *Studies in the History of International Cultural Relations*, University of Tokyo Press, 2013.

a starting point. In fact, such attempts at demythologizing in previous studies do not by themselves lead researchers of international relations to a post-Westphalian view of history. Westphalia's view of history is much more deeply related to the very structure of the discipline of international relations than has been previously thought, and it is a problem that cannot be superficially labeled such as changing birthdays or places of birth.

(2) The Myth is still haunting

Despite this, this myth has not disappeared from the texts of international relations studies, and it still persists. In the first place, almost none of the scholars of international relations, including the author, are educating about the system of sovereign states without mentioning the Treaty of Westphalia in the field of education. The following is an excerpt from a textbook on international relations (all translated by the author).

In 1648, when the Thirty Years' War was coming to an end, the Treaty of Westphalia formed a new modern state system. A self-regulating balance of power system began to take root among nations⁶⁶.

The Treaty of Westphalia is important in that it establishes the fundamental elements of international law concerning sovereignty and marks the beginning of the modern international system⁶⁷.

The peace treaties of Westphalia and Osnabrück established the legal basis of the modern state government, and the implications of the treaty established the basic laws and structure of world politics. Over the next four centuries, the peace treaties of Westphalia and Osnabrück formed the normative structure of the modern world order⁶⁸.

Of course, in some cases, there are descriptions that add a certain amount of reservation. Although it is the direct subject of the discussion in this chapter, it is particularly prominent in the textbook descriptions of Japan scholars of international relations, such as:

The Thirty Years' War, in which the surrounding countries intervened in the religious civil war of Germany (Holy Roman Empire) in 1618, and the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended it, were regarded as the direct impetus for changing the hierarchical international relations of medieval Europe and giving birth to the new characteristics of international relations in the form of a Western system of states. The Thirty Years' War had a religious dimension of a protestant uprising against the authority of the Catholic Church and a secular aspect of a power struggle between kings and lords against the authority of the pope. The Treaty of Westphalia granted that kings had exclusive rights in their territories as well as the power to determine the religion within their dominions, and externally states were granted equal sovereignty. In other words, it is said that the Treaty of Westphalia was an opportunity for nations to break away from the medieval religious and universal hierarchical order and to share the recognition of a state with sovereignty, territory, and people (people belonging to the territory), that is, a sovereign state.

After the Treaty of Westphalia, international relations did not change all at once from the hierarchical system that had been used up to that time, and the international system centered on sovereign states gradually

66 Robert J. Jackson, *Global Politics in the 21st Century*, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p.37.

67 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *Principles of International Politics*, 5th ed., CQ Press: Sage, 2013, p.317.

68 Anthony McGrew, "Globalization and World Politics," in: John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 5th ed., Oxford University Press, 2011, p.231.

took root in Western Europe from the 17th to the 18th century. It was also not until the 20th century that the system of sovereign states spread to all corners of the world. In East Asia in the 17th and 18th centuries, there was a loose hierarchical system (Chinese order) centered on Chinese dynasties such as the Ming and Qing dynasties that dominated the countries and peoples of the surrounding regions, and in the vast area between Europe and East Asia, there was a hierarchical international system of Islam under the control of Muslims (Muslims). In addition, economically, trade was active in various parts of the world beyond Europe, and each system was connected by trade⁶⁹.

This statement has important implications in the sense that it is a historical perspective of international relations studies that cannot be included in international relations theory, but I would like to leave that point aside for the time being. Now, in the first place, why do we still try to maintain this myth in a situation where its mythology is becoming apparent? In this regard, the point made by Takayama is one clue⁷⁰. Although Takayama himself does not mention the impetus for the introduction of the Westphalian view of history into the field of international politics, he uses Osiander's theory of the 1948 Gross thesis as the period when international political scientists began to emphasize the year 1648. Takayama contrasts the gross paper with Krasner's paper, which deals with this issue in the context of recent sovereignty theory, and introduces the concept of "symbolic signs."

Here, a "symbolic sign" is a landmark erected by historians to confirm the significance of a historical event. For example, if we say that event A symbolizes the formation (demise) of event B, then A is accorded the role of a "symbolic sign" in relation to B. Of course, B did not suddenly come into existence (demise) by A, and even if the process of formation (demise) began long before A and continued after A, and even if there are various possible causes other than A, if the historian judges that A occupies a pivotal position in ascertaining the significance of its formation, he will concentrate his attention on it⁷¹.

Takayama compares the two papers and considers Kleiner's rejection of the myth to be unconvincing. He concludes that some kind of symbolic sign is necessary to "make" history, and that the "orthodox" view will not be overturned unless the alternative to the symbolic sign to replace Westphalia is convincing. Takayama's argument summarizes the general thinking related to the third point, why the view of history is not overturned. Regardless of whether or not it is a historical fact in the strict sense of the word, it remains evident that there is no inconvenience in adopting it as long as there is no "sign" to replace it.

In addition, Takayama also said about Teschke,

Like Krasner, Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations* (Verso, 2003). Ibid., pp. 2-4, 11, 13-39, 215-248. In particular, the author's point that the cause of the failure of traditional international relations in 1648 was "the identification of absolutist state sovereignty with modern sovereignty" (p. 245) contains valuable suggestions. But even this does not seem to nullify our verification work on the significance of Westphalia as a "symbolic sign"⁷².

This is a passage that vividly illustrates the importance of the consideration of the third point, which has

69 Kunio Kume, Yoshie Kawade, Yoshiko Koshiro, Aiji Tanaka, Masaru Mabuchi, *Political Science*, Yuhikaku, 2011, pp. 140-141.

70 Iwao Takayama, "Westphalia Studies," *International Politics*, No. 160, 2010, pp. 48-63.

71 Ibid., p. 54.

72 Ibid., p. 63.

not been fully developed in the discussions of Teshke and Akashi, for scholars of international relations. The idea that the historical origins of a discipline are chosen in virtue of their usefulness as a “symbolic marker” rather than for absolutely confirmed historical facts is not peculiar to Takayama’s account alone.

(3) The “complex interdependence” of myth-defenders and myth-busters

As described above, in the current study of international relations, there has been considerable progress in demonstrating the mythical nature of Westphalian view of history and preliminary consideration of the process of mythological formation. For most scholars of international relations, however, this myth does not need to be dismissed, and it is maintained with reservations, both in research and education, and especially in the “discipline” aspect of discipline. The myth-destroyers have heralded the end of the myth, and the myth-keepers have defended the myth (apart from the depth of their belief in the myth), and there has been little or no sign of a settling dispute between the two.

In general, scientific discoveries, such as new archaeological discoveries, can occur with dates rewritten, if not often, such as the birth of mankind or the formation of the Jomon culture. If the draft of *The Brothers Karamazov* was found more than 20 years ago, it would have the potential to rewrite not only the study of the author but also the history of literature itself. But this is not the case with Westphalian mythology. To put it succinctly, this static situation is desirable for both myth disruptors and myth maintainers. For myth-destroyers, the more formidable the myth, the more valuable research aimed at destruction is, and the need for such research will continue to be maintained. Regardless of whether or not we consciously use this point, the situation in which the myth is maintained no matter how much we continue to destroy it lies within the sphere of interest of the myth destroyer.

On the other hand, the same is true for myth maintainers, and the fact that myths are maintained no matter how many myth-destroying arguments are accumulated benefits the maintainers, but the situation on the part of the maintainers is a little more complicated, as described below.

If the above description is accurate in the grand scheme of things, it can be asserted that this situation is like what international political economy calls a situation of “complex interdependence,” and that it is better to maintain a kind of interdependent coexistence in the present situation than to settle it through a thorough dispute (the use of force, so to speak). The debate over the myth of Westphalia is thus at a stalemate, and there seems to be a tacit agreement on maintaining that stalemate. In fact, the controversy over the basic premise of international relations may be that a tacit agreement has been established to maintain such a stalemate, and as a result, the “idiosyncratic” nature of the various assumptions has been destroyed but maintained.

(4) Scope and range of myths

Here, I would like to present two important points regarding the demythologization of the Westphalian view of history, although they are rarely expounded within international relations theory. The first is the scope of mythology. The Westphalian view of history is a historical understanding of the birth, events, and places of birth of the modern sovereign state system, so to speak, the temporal and spatial origins, but almost all scholars of international relations tend to discuss the historical perception of the modern sovereign state system alone. However, the modern system of sovereign states is only one element or phase of the “state of the world” in the process of the formation of the modern world. In other words, in the course of the emergence of the modern world, the modern system of sovereign states must have been formed in relation to the formation of other elements or phases of world composition, but it seems that almost no one has thought about this.

What is the modern way of structuring the world? One of these hypotheses is the diagram of “ego, state,

and international relations” presented by the author based on his research on the peace theories of Sanjuro Tomonaga and Kant⁷³. “Ego, State, and International Relations” consists of the following cross-referential three-tiered structure.

In other words, it is a three-tiered structure consisting of individuals rooted in an independent and autonomous ego, a state (society) composed of such individuals, and a conditional international relations (society) that cannot be dissolved into a world state composed of such independent and autonomous states. Let us tentatively call this “ego, state, and international relations.” This is the cross-referential and circular referential mechanism that defines the modern worldview, and it is the framework for questioning and thinking about “what is international relations” in the modern era. Modern understanding of international relations, whether accepted or criticized, inevitably presupposes the state of the world based on this mechanism⁷⁴.

This schema is mentioned by Kant in *For Eternal Peace*, and has been revealed in the genealogy of debates over its interpretation. The implication of this hypothesis is that the modern system of sovereign states has been formed at the same time as the state of the world at the ego level and the state level, and while mutually binding them, and that it is difficult to separate them. Leaving aside the validity of this hypothesis, it is undeniable that the Westphalian view of history and its critiques have been developed in a way that extracts only one element of the formation of the modern worldview, so to speak, and “extracts it.” This chapter will not examine any further issues in this direction, but it should be pointed out that in this sense, the pretense of the debate over the Westphalian view of history may be too narrow in the examination of this view of history.

Another point of contention is the scope of mythology. Specifically, it is the so-called perception of international relations in the non-Western world, that is, the influence of the theory of international relations in the non-Western world, before it was introduced, and after its introduction, and the manner in which it was received. If, as is commonly known, Westphalian view of history was to be accepted, the present international community would be hypothesized to be the international community established in Europe and expanded to the size of the earth. In this case, paradoxically, for the non-Western world, the myth of Westphalia literally means nothing more than a myth. This is because the non-Western world did not live the history of European international relations, at least not at the time of Westphalia.

Taking Japan as an example, as Masao Maruyama once pointed out, Japan since the opening of the country has tended to simultaneously⁷⁵ pinch Western thought and philosophy without historical structure or context. Only after a certain degree of acceptance has progressed, historians of philosophy, such as Sanjuro Tomonaga, will present the historical context based on the interpretation of the neo-Kantian school in the case of Tomonaga, but this context does not include the historical development of philosophy and thought in Japan. Thus, for the external non-Western world, the Westphalian view of history is difficult to perceive as a reflection of the historical experiences in which it participates. The aforementioned modest reservations in Japan textbooks may reflect the historical context of the acceptance of such global ideas rather than the result of the work of Teschke and others.

Thus, if we accept history “without social context” (Masao Maruyama), it does not make much difference whether the date of birth is 1648 or 1713, and whether the event is the Treaty of Westphalia or the Treaty of Utrecht. And without bringing up the current demographic composition of the earth, it seems to the vast majority of the world’s people that the historical events on which the Westphalian view of history and its

73 Atsushi Shibasaki, “Sanjuro Tomonaga’s Perception of International Relations,” *International Politics*, No. 156, 2009, pp. 18-36; Atsushi Shibasaki, *Perception of International Relations in Modern Japan: Sanjuro Tomonaga and Kant’s Theory of Peace*, Sobunsha, 2009.

74 Shibasaki, *supra*.

75 Masao Maruyama, *The Thought of Japan*, Iwanami Shinsho, Iwanami Shoten, 1961.

mythological denial are focused are received only as such.

I will leave the discussion on this point for another time, but in this sense, we must consider why this myth has been maintained, criticized, and stabilized in this way.

(5) Is a “myth” really a “myth”?

Finally, I would like to raise a more fundamental point and return to the original argument of this chapter. That is, is the Westphalian view of history really a “myth”? The word “myth” is not limited to the Westphalian view of history, but is a term that is frequently used by those who want to overthrow the “myth”. However, most commentators have hardly examined the validity of using the word “myth” in discussing the Westphalian view of history, nor have they provided any evidence for compelling the use of the word “myth.”

Of course, it is understandable that people would try to use the word “myth” when “what they think is fact” is actually not the case, when facts that are different from historical facts are believed to be facts, are accepted, and circulated. Without bringing up Weber’s concept of de-magic, it is the intrinsic mission of scholarship to clarify that what has been thought to be true is “in fact” not⁷⁶. However, if the word “myth” is substituted, it may be truncated and the entire function that the “myth” has fulfilled may not be taken into account. For example, there are essential questions such as why a “myth” has been believed, and why has the “myth” had so much power. In this sense, we should be aware that we may have to free ourselves from the temptation to use the word “myth.”

Let us examine this point based on Kei Takeuchi’s argument. As Takeuchi argues, social scientists must distinguish between (1) substance, (2) approach, and (3) ideology⁷⁷. Entity is what actually exists. Of course, careful consideration must be given to the question of what is an entity and whether “existence” itself can be completely divided into approaches and ideologies, and it must be taken into account the myriad scientific debates, but I will not go into it further.

Approaches take the form of hypotheticals, assumptions, and theories, and there are various types such as individualistic and totalitarian approaches. It is important to note that the approach is not an entity per se, but only a way of considering the actual situation with the assumption that it is so. Rather, entities are those that allow for the assumptions and interpretations of an almost infinite number of approaches (and ideologies). But approaches are evaluated in terms of what assumptions and theories can be established when an entity is viewed from a certain point of view, and how effective it is in regard of its analytic capacities. Finally, ideology is about thinking of entities as they should be, whatever they are, and the difference with the approach is that if the approach fails to analyze the substance well, the approach must be modified or changed, whereas in the case of an ideology, it is rather necessary to align the substance with the ideology. It is to try to consider only those entities that fit the ideology to be entities.

In this context, what is the Westphalian view of history? First, it is not the “substance” itself. Second, in that it is maintained within the theory of international relations even before and after criticism, that is, in the sense that it is appropriate to postulate it as a discipline regardless of the substance, there seems to be a mixture of elements of approach and ideology. Changing birthdays and events means changing your approach, and maintaining a “myth” when it is pointed out is maintaining an ideology. The question of why the debate over Westphalian history and its mythology has such a nature will be discussed in this chapter.

76 Sozo Omori, *Objects and Minds*, University of Tokyo Press, 1975.

77 Kei Takeuchi, *Science and Technology, Earth System, and Human*, Iwanami Shoten, 2001.

2. Westphalian discourse and the “Third Perception” in International Relations Theory

| | 2nd Recognition Accepted | 2nd Recognition Denied |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| 1st Recognition Accepted | Strong Westphalian | Weak De-Westphalian |
| 1st Recognition Denied | Weak Westphalian | Strong De-Westphalian |

Figure 1-1 Westphalian Historical Views and Post-Westphalian Historical Perspectives Created by the author

As mentioned above, the Westphalian view of history is, firstly, a historical understanding of the set of births and events (places of birth) in which the expression of the world structure of the modern sovereign state system was born in Europe in 1648, and secondly, an understanding of the historical process by which the international system, which is the current world structure, was established by the expansion of this modern international community that was born in Europe to the size of the earth.

The implication of the Westphalian view of history that includes these two realizations is that the second knowledge can work whether the first knowledge, the specific point of reference for the set of births and events, is the Westphalian peace or not. The first perception has been questioned by Teshke and Kinji Akashi when the mythological nature of Westphalia has been pointed out, but even if the first perception is shaken, it does not mean that the second perception automatically collapses. This is because, although the mythical nature of the first perception overturns the conventional wisdom about the validity of the Peace of Westphalia as a birthday, the result is that a modern system of sovereign states was born in Europe at some point in the modern era, regardless of when the date of birth, and that the modern system of Western sovereign states that originated in Europe expanded to the size of the earth. This is because it does not fundamentally deny that it is the origin of the current system of sovereign states.

Regardless of the theoretical position, the theory of international relations, whether it affirms or denies it, basically accepts these two historical understandings. As far as we can see from the general textbook descriptions of international relations that we have already observed, there are two patterns of acceptance, as shown in Figure 1-1. The first is either a pattern in which both the first and second knowledge are inherited, or a pattern in which the first premise is questioned and reserved, but the second premise is not denied. Let us call the former a strong Westphalian view of history in the history of international relations, and the latter a weak Westphalian view of history in the history of international relations.

On the other hand, the post-Westphalian view of history can also be divided into the following two patterns. The weak post-Westphalian view of history is the idea that, although the birthday is accepted, the subsequent historical development is not a global expansion of the European international order. And a strong post-Westphalian view of history contradicts the recognition of both sides.

If we were to briefly summarize the history of the reception of the Westphalian view of history in the history of international relations based on the studies introduced in Section 1, it would generally go through the following three stages. The first stage is the period when international relations theory accepts this view of history in a way that does not explicitly cite the Peace of Westphalia as a point of reference, but accepts a second recognition. This is roughly the period from the post-World War II period to the 1960-70s, which corresponds to the Gross papers to the Folk papers.

The second stage is a period in which the first recognition was gradually adopted as a basis to reinforce the validity of the second perception and the validity of the academic assumptions that had been formed in the form described below, and a strong Westphalian view of history began to be seen explicitly. This is roughly the period from the 70s to the end of the Cold War, when the priority of state actors was reaffirmed,

at least within mainstream international relations theory, while criticism of the first recognition due to the rise of the theory of interdependence and non-state agency theory was made. The third stage is a period in which globalization and the advent of “new wars” have once again placed reservations and doubts on the first perception, but the second recognition has been maintained, especially after the end of the Cold War, especially in the 21st century and beyond.

It becomes clear from the above arrangement that the existing myth destroyers have worked hard to destroy the first perception, but have rather preserved the second perception, and in that sense they have not completely destroyed the myth. In other words, the myth-destroyers were in the position of criticizing a strong Westphalian view of history with a weak Westphalian view of history. On the other hand, while acknowledging the first and denying or reserving the second, I accept the European view of Westphalian history, but the global system of sovereign states has been formed by the global interrelations of various Western and non-Western actors, and is not simply a global expansion of the Westphalian system. This argument is rarely found within international relations theory (however, in Japan international relations studies, this point is often maintained in the form cited in the introduction due to the circumstances seen in the previous section), but rather in analysis from the perspective of global history outside international relations theory (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, it can be said that there is no point of view that denies and reserves the recognition of both sides, which is, so to speak, a post-Westphalian view of history.

Why is this the case? This is because there is an important common understanding in international relations that seems to be closely related to these two perceptions, but is not so definitively linked. In the following, I would like to present two perceptions of Westphalian history in the theory of international relations.

The first recognition: the origins of modern European international relations are the Peace of Westphalia.

The second recognition: the origins of current international relations lie in the international relations of modern Europe.

In terms of the relationship between history and theory, the work of myth busters such as Teshke and Akashi was aimed at the first perception. It has already become quite common that the first perception has lost its validity in line with historical facts, and that it is, so to speak, a “created tradition.” However, even if the first perception is questioned, there is a movement to deal with it by shifting the date of birth back or backward, or by testing the validity of the benchmark with various factors⁷⁸ Such a move does not undermine the second perception, but rather reinforces it. There is also a kind of re-opening judgment that since the Bench mark is necessary in any case, as Iwao Takayama did, it should be left in Westphalia, and this is something that most scholars of international relations must have experienced when giving lectures to beginners.

This raises an important question: can the intellectual framework of the theory of international relations be sustained, whether it is ahistorical, for better or for worse? In other words, even if the two perceptions are overturned, it will be possible to assert that the basic rules of international relations today will remain the same, regardless of their origins, where, or how they have developed, and therefore, even if the first and second perceptions are overturned, there is no connection to the theory of international relations as an ordinary science. In other words, no matter how much we “deconstruct” both the strong and weak views of Westphalian history as a conventional wisdom, and even if the two perceptions are completely abandoned, it is possible to take the position that the assumptions of international relations as an academic discipline are not shaken in the slightest. The scope of the myth-destroyer’s argument does not reach this position.

78 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, “Rethinking benchmark dates in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations*, 20, no. 2, 2014, pp. 437–462.

Even if the Westphalian view of history, which consists of the first and second perceptions, is rejected by historical facts, it is the next recognition that remains.

Third: The international relations that the theory of international relations considers are primarily relations between modern sovereign states, and although there are other entities that play an important role, the most important entity is the modern sovereign state, and the most important relationship is the relationship between modern sovereign states.

The Westphalian view of history is thought to have played a role in explaining the basis of the existence of modern international relations as an object of study in the academic field of international relations, but it has not played a role in directly supporting the validity of this third perception. Even if Westphalia as a birthday is denied, even if the discourse that modern international relations were established as a global standard in modern European international relations is denied, this third recognition persists. The Westphalian view of history seems to historically guarantee the validity of this third cognition, but the third knowledge is comparable to the rules of the game on which the theory is constructed, and the rules of the game remain unaltered, whether they were born in 1648 or not, whether they were spread from Europe to the globe, or not. It has a strong legitimacy in the sense that it is still the current rule in the academic field of international relations theory. In the previous section, when I discussed the view of Westphalian history from a non-Western standpoint, I mentioned that a similar position is possible, but in fact this has the ironic consequence that the theory of international relations can be developed as a global discipline without history.

This third recognition cites the Westphalian view of history because the more international relations theory pursues autonomy as an academic discipline, the more it seeks to historically reinforce its own academic independence. And this act is the creation of a “myth” in the form of using history only for the purpose of taking the validity of the methodological process from the standpoint of present-centrism. More than the mythical nature of Westphalia’s view of history, the problem is that the discipline of international relations is linked to history only as a “myth.”

Relying on this third understanding, many scholars of international relations can argue that, even if they accept the claims of myth-busters, this does not mean that they need to fundamentally change the disciplines and education in which they are engaged in their daily lives. The reason why this situation occurs is that academics and scholars uncritically accept the third perception as the rules of the game (production of achievements, reproduction of researchers) through specialization and subdivision, and devote themselves to conducting research and education according to the rules of the game. Nevertheless they do not pose the question as to why the rules of the game exist, and why international relations is a discipline stipulated according to the rules of the game in the first place? In addition, it seems that there is a situation in international relations theory that allows us to proceed with research and analysis by pushing the interest in international relations theory to the outside world, such as why international relations as an academic discipline is bound by such assumptions, and what kind of scholarship should be conducted. This reminds us of the consequence that, as Ichikawa contends, science is possible as long as the “loop of hypothesis and verification” is turned, and that science itself is possible even if we are indifferent to why and how the object of scientific knowledge exists⁷⁹.

As described above, the Westphalian view of history appears directly as the first and second perception in international relations theory. The first and second perception seem to provide a historical basis for advancing scholarship with the third knowledge. Westphalia’s view of history is the basis for the assertion that international relations theory plays an important role as a discipline that examines the modern international system, which comprehensively constitutes the current world, and that the modern international system is the object that humans should control in solving various world problems and realizing a better world. In this

79 Atsunobu Ichikawa, *Five Conditions for the Evolution of Science*, Iwanami Shoten, 2008.

sense, the Westphalian view of history also serves as a historical basis that guarantees the social significance of the existence of the discipline of why international relations theory must exist as a subject of international relations.

However, even if the first and second perceptions are overturned or denied, the third recognition is not automatically undermined. In other words, the third recognition has become the norm in the academic field of international relations. Regardless of whether or not the origins of modern European international relations are the Peace of Westphalia, and whether or not the origins of current international relations are to be localized in modern Europe; as long as there is the third perception that defines the present world, the study of international relations is based on the premise of the third perception, and it has become a discipline that can run on its own. In other words, if the validity of this third recognition is destroyed, the validity of the academic field of international relations theory will cease to exist, and at least if this third recognition is fundamentally changed, the obviousness of the basis for the existence of the academic field of international relations theory will be lost.

Thus, the reason why the discussion of myth destruction so far has not led to a complete renewal of the theory of international relations is that the myth busters were so obsessed with the subversion of the first perception that they were relatively indifferent to the existence of the second cognition, and because of this they did not think about the relationship between the first and second perceptions and the third cognition.

The third point of recognition is that, first, the primary object of consideration in the theory of international relations is the relationship between the modern sovereign state and the modern sovereign state, and the second is that the position of the subject of primary consideration remains unchanged, no matter what activities of other entities are included in the theory of international relations. In other words, the theory of international relations is based on the premise that the valuation of sovereign states and relations between sovereign states as the most important subject and the most important relationship will never change in any form.

By relying on this third recognition, the theory of international relations places three centrism at the core of its discipline (the first is sovereign state-centrism, the first is interstate relations-centrism, and the third is power politics-centrism). The basis of these three centrism is, as is well known, the concept of sovereignty/anarchy. The concept of sovereignty is the ultimate basis for the qualitative difference between sovereign states and other “non-state” actors, the first is the basis for the first concept, and the second is based on the concept of anarchy as its colorary. And the third concept is almost automatically rationalized as sovereignty, the color of anarchy.

3. The History of International Relations as a Commentary on Westphalian Historical Discourse

Based on the grasp of Section 2, the following hypothesis can be established if we take the history of international relations as an academic discipline as a whole.

International relations theory is a discipline that has been formed in accordance with the third perception, which remains even after stripping away the Westphalian view of history, which appears as the first and second recognitions. Regardless of whether we affirm or deny this, it has developed as an academic discipline that first refers to the sovereign state as the most important subject, recognizes that international relations are primarily interstate relations, and that the center of consideration is undeniably international relations as interstate relations. However, this recognition was not necessarily clearly recognized from the beginning, but was re-realized and verbalized through repeated self-observation that international relations theory constantly conducts.

From this point of view, all theories and theories of international relations have been a history of theories and theories concerning how to interpret and evaluate the third perception and the three centrism that result

from it. In this sense, the history of international relations is nothing more than a history of the evolution of the deviation of evaluations of the third premise woven by the trilogy of sovereignty, anarchy, and power politics, which appears to be guaranteed by being “historically” grounded through the Westphalian view of history, but in fact runs itself in a form that transcends that view of history in a way that transcends history.” There is only one theory or idea of international relations, and all the histories of international relations are merely commentaries on the Westphalian view of history. This has been true of some of the great debates of the past, and in the recent explanation of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, as well as in the claims of other isms.

The fact that the history of international relations is only a “commentary” on the three centrism means that the premise that the third perception cannot be overturned, no matter what criticism it makes, and continues to be maintained. No matter how much the role of so-called non-state actors increases, no matter how much the frequency and likelihood of interstate wars diminish, no matter how much practice and reflection on non-nationally motivated (or negative) non-pacifist motives are accumulated, they cannot be given more status than a vast list of exceptions or commentaries to the principle.

However, current international relations theory, and by extension international relations research, includes many subjects other than sovereign states. This means that the scope of study is expanding. The expansion of the collection means that a perspective has been introduced on the prevention of war between sovereign states (based on objectives other than negative pacifism and state-based motives of survival, maintenance, and expansion of states). Nonetheless, in the theory of international relations, the territorial setting based on the primordial purpose and viewpoint setting of the sovereign state is still maintained, in which the most important subject is the sovereign state and the most important relationship is the sovereign state relationship.

This phenomenon can be called the “patching” of perspectives and the “addition” of domains. The addition of perspectives means that perspectives that are in line with the practical purpose of solving a wide variety of global issues, such as the elimination of poverty and disparity, the elimination of human rights violations and discrimination, multicultural and multiethnic coexistence, and the prevention of environmental destruction and the pursuit of sustainability, are additionally introduced into international relations theory. However, the theory of international relations as a “theory” has continued to place the perspective of state studies and (negative) peace studies above these perspectives. No reason or reason for this was to change its superiority, and the academic opportunity to make changes to it was eliminated.

The expansion of the domain means that the various social forces necessary for thinking about solving the global issues described above, namely the thoughts and actions of various entities such as international organizations, multinational corporations, NGOs, civil society organizations, and individuals, which are grouped under the names of non-state actors, will be added to the scope of consideration one after another. Transnational and global networks of governance and cooperation are a prime example.

With reference to such a structure, it can be argued that no matter how many objectives and perspectives have been added and diversified in international relations theory, and no matter how much the scope of consideration has been expanded and expanded, the primordial purpose and domain setting have not been relativized. What did this “patching” of objectives and “expansion” of domains contribute to the theory of international relations as an academic discipline?

Since then, international relations theory has expanded its domain by adding perspectives based on the third recognition. In other words, the theory of international relations has continued to increase inconsistencies in the process of its “development.” International relations theory was originally established by limiting the scope of interstate relations based on two dynamics, but now it is encompassing all kinds of relations that transcend national borders around the world by setting up perspectives other than the two motives. This expansion of perspectives and areas has led to the constant diversification and breadth of theories in international relations theory, and at the same time, the phenomenon of continuing controversies without

resolving contradictions and inconsistencies between theories (in other words, this is the inevitable reason why debates become apparently “rich” and “diverse”). In this way, as the succession and expansion continue, the inconsistency between theories will continue to increase, and it will become difficult to see a unified picture of the world as a whole, including relations between states other than the relations between states as the object of the theory of international relations. This is the theoretical aporia of international relations theory.

The “expansion” of perspectives and domains is not progressively resolved by the re-establishment of perspectives and domains associated with expansion, but is handled only in the form of “patching” and “building-up” since it is dealt with only in a way that never cancels the priority of the third cognition. The arguments of the myth-destroyers who criticize the Westphalian view of history are forced to spin in front of this wall of priorities that will never be overturned, and that it is necessary to face this wall itself.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that the study of international relations, especially the Westphalian view of history in international relations, has a much deeper academic structural implication than the current myth-busters and myth-maintainers superficially assume, criticize, and defend. The problem was that it proved insufficient to change birthdays or events, or to correct and delete textbook descriptions. Existing myth-busters tend to focus on the debate over the first perception, but it is difficult to arrive at a prevailing post-Westphalian view of history unless the second and third perceptions are also considered.

What is crucial is the question as to why the theory of international relations has emerged as a form of scholarship that can only deal with the Westphalian view of history in this way. In order to elucidate this issue, we must first examine the implications of the Westphalian view of history, which existed before the establishment of the theory of international relations itself, once it was discussed within the theory of international relations. Second, since the establishment of the theory of international relations, we are compelled to analyze how the Westphalian view of history has functioned both within the theory of international relations as an academic knowledge and in actual international relations⁸⁰.

Chapter 6

Temporality in The Study of International Relations: Theoretical Perspectives on “De-substituting/De-departing” Chrono-Politics

The purpose of this chapter is to show that there are two types of temporal theories in the study of international relations, namely, the “substituting type” and the “de-substituting type,” to clarify the problems of both types, and to present the issues that must be considered in order to construct temporal studies in the future. Specifically, the first section analyzes the basic issues, and the second section examines the current status and issues of the “temporal turn” derived from critical theory, and clarifies the structural aporia of temporal theory in international relations studies and its causes. It will be shown that this aporia is not only limited to temporal theory, but is also a structural problem in which critical theories in international relations studies are in a state of limbo with their adversaries, the “mainstream” state-centered theories of international relations.

80 For a preliminary discussion of this book, see Atsushi Shibasaki, “Myths or a Discipline: IR and the Peace of Westphalia,” *Journal of Global Media Studies*, 14, pp. 41-52. From *Research on International Relations to Research on Global Relations*, in *Annual Report of Political Science 2015-1 Political Theory and Empirical Research Dialogue*, edited by the Japan Political Science Association, Bokutakusha, 2015.

Section 3 discusses Japanese philosopher Shozo Omori's theory of time, and Section 4 draws on Japanese sociologist Sosuke Mita's comparative sociological theory of time (including his works under the name "Yusuke Maki") to identify issues that time theory in international relations research has not been able to consider so far. Finally, in Section 5, I summarize the discussion and present the theoretical issues of temporality studies starting from a fundamental consideration of the relationship between proto-time and (proto)space.

1. Main Question and the Essentials of the Argument

Two Types

The purpose of this chapter is to examine time theory in international relations research from the perspective of the "challenge to chrono-politics" in this book, and to gain perspectives for future research. The underlying question is "What does it mean for the social sciences, including international relations, to study time? This question must of course be answered as a system of the deepest questions about what it means for "science," including social science, to study "time".

The starting point of "The Challenge of Time and Politics" was the question: "Social sciences, including international relations and political science, have not adequately dealt with the problem of time". There are two major ways to handle this question. The first is an "substituting" approach, which asks what would happen if the element of time were incorporated into the existing framework of social science. The second is a "breakaway" approach. In other words, since the modern world as a whole is bound by modern temporality, modern social science itself is also bound by modern temporality, and modern social science and its subset, international relations research and political science, must break free from this binding nature and consider time. The authors of this book refer to this as "the time of the modern world". The argument of Yonosuke Nagai, to which all the authors of this book refer, is a mixture of the substituting type and the departure type⁸¹.

Substituting/Departing

A typical example of a substituting-type argument is Pierson's⁸². This method is relatively easy, but at the same time it has a structural flaw. That is, it does not basically address the "straitjacket" nature of modern temporality in the social sciences, which is the premise of the second method, and thus does not lead to an "empirical" analysis of time. It neither leads to an investigation of the nature of temporality. This is the "modus operandi" of transforming and assigning new elements that have been frequently repeated in the so-called "empirical" social sciences to suit existing academic methods, in the sense of rearranging and assigning issues, not limited to "time," that have not been analyzed or paid attention to so far, to fit into the tools at hand. The "modus operandi" of transforming and substituting new elements to conform to existing academic methods, which have been frequently repeated in so-called "empirical" social sciences. As international relations and political science are clad in the straitjacket of modern temporality, this must first be called into question.

On the other hand, in the field of international relations, a series of critical theory-derived works, such as those by Hutchings and Hom, have emerged and flourished in the past decade⁸³. This in itself is not a bad

81 Nagai, Yonosuke, *Jikan no Seijigaku (The Politics of Time)*, Chuko shosha 1979.

82 Pierson, Paul *Politics in Time: History, institutions, and social analysis*, Princeton University Press, 2004 (translated by Yuko Kasuya, *Politics in Time*, Keiso Shobo, 2010).

83 Kimberly Hutchings, *Time and World Politics: Thinking the present*, Manchester University Press, 2008. Andrew R. Hom, *Time and International Relations Theory* (MA Thesis for the University of Kansas), 2008. Hom, "Hegemonic Metronome:

thing, but the way in which time is treated in these works often follows a cut-and-dried “departing” paradigm. They point out the fact that we are in bondage and present scenarios for breaking out of it, but in many cases two important questions remain missing, or at least inadequately answered. First, “why did such restraints occur”? The second is a discussion that proposes what should be done in order to realize the “departing” scenario.

Needless to say, this way of framing an argument is common to almost all critical-theoretical discussions, not only in temporal theory, but also in international relations studies and political science, which point out some problems that have been assumed and propose the need to remedy them. Presenting a “departing” scenario without asking these questions may complicitly preserve and fix the problematic nature of the mainstream treatment of time. This is also a structural factor that prevents any “breakaway” theory from breaking away from breakaway theory.

The above-mentioned opposition between the “substitution type” and the “breakaway type” in the study of time in political science and international relations is the composition of the opposition between “positivism,” which tends to lean toward quantitative analysis based on an overly narrow concept of “science,” and “critical theory,” which questions the norms and values underlying the basic premise, in the post-Great Debate era in international relations studies. The conflict in international relations research in the post-Great Controversy era can be said to be directly reflected in the composition of the conflict⁸⁴. Aside from political science as a whole, at least time studies in international relations research has been presented and developed within such a framework.

Time and Human History

How then should we discuss this issue? The author’s position is that, although at first glance it may appear to be close to the “breakout type,” the “breakout type” actually suffers from structural limitations that are commonly shared with the “substituting type,” and that we should start our discussion from a point where we can surpass these limitations. In other words, there are things that need to be considered before we can move on to the issues of origin and process and the specific practice of “what should we do?” In other words, the author’s argument is that since the modern world as a whole is bound by modern temporality, it proves necessary to go “one step further” in pointing out that the social sciences, which are part of the modern world, are also bound by it.

The “one step further” is to go into the situation itself, that is, “researchers themselves who are bound by modern temporality and their kind of discussions are also bound by modern temporality. As long as the researcher, the subject of analysis, is unaware that he or she is under this same constraint, no matter how much he or she assigns, no matter how much he or she argues for a departure from it, the situation will not move.

It is quite natural to assume that international relations scholars, who are the subjects of the statement “The modern world is bound by modern temporality, and so is international relations theory,” are likewise bound by modern temporality. However, although international relations scholars themselves are also the objects of the modern world, they are trying to discuss the binding nature of international relations research by putting their own binding nature on the shelf. To put it simply, the subject of this intellectual activity, who produces “critical” texts that critique and combine the discourses of various thinkers and theorists from seemingly high

the ascendancy of Western Standard of Time”, *Review of International Studies*, 36, 2010, pp. 1145-1170. Hom, “Time, Narrative, and IR Theory” (Paper submitted to 6th ECPR General Conference University of Iceland (25th – 27th Aug. 2011), 2011.

84 Aya Kuzuya and Atsushi Shibasaki (eds.), *Kokusai Seiji Gaku Ha Owatta Noka (The End of “International Relations”? A Response from Japan)*, Nakanishiya Shuppan, 2018.

places, is himself living his daily life constrained by the modern temporality.

Based on this problematic consciousness, it is evident that in the discussion of the temporality turn in international relations theory, the breakaway theory has been accumulating without the breakaway theorists themselves consciously reflecting in their own discussions the fact that they themselves wear the straitjacket of modern temporality underlying the breakaway theory. Modern social science is another style of knowledge defined by modern temporality, and so is the modern social scientist who produces it. If we are to truly attempt a “temporal turn” from the most radical point, it is indispensable for modern social scientists themselves to be aware of their own shackles and to consider how they can be departing of them. Without this, no matter how much they “assign” and advocate “breaking free,” their approach can only result in the reproduction and maintenance of modern temporality. Social science itself must inevitably accept the challenge of transforming itself in accordance with the essential meaning of time itself, including modern temporality, for human beings, society, and academia.

Structure of this Chapter

In order to advance these considerations, this chapter constructs a perspective that reveals the relationship between human beings and time, and between science and time, by critically joining the theories of time of the philosopher Shozo Omori and the sociologist Yusuke Maki (Munesuke Mita). By reexamining the temporal turn in international relations theory, I point out the possibility and direction of a more fundamental temporal turn, which is possible and necessary for researchers who advocate a temporal turn. This will be the tentative goal of this chapter.

In the following section, in Section 2, I review the temporality turn in international relations theory and depict its characteristics and limitations from the viewpoint of the issues discussed in this section. Then, in Sections 3 and 4, I will attempt to cross-stitch the temporal theories of Shozo Omori and Yusuke Maki, and sharpen the analytical tools. Finally, in Section 5, we present future prospects by analyzing the discussion in Section 2 and some of the previous studies that have been considered in this book as a whole, using the tools of Sections 3 and 4.

2 The “Temporal Turn” in International Relations

Summative Evaluation in *Millennium*

The “temporal turn” in international relations theory is a general term for a number of debates that have emerged in the last decade or so since the late 2000s, starting with Hutchings and Hom, and which are basically breakaway-type debates derived from critical theory. In recent years, a number of works on theoretical analysis and case analysis, including Hom et al.’s textbooks, have been published⁸⁵. “The Politics of Time in International Relations: Millennium Conference” was held by the journal *Millennium* at the LSE in London in 2017 with the intention of summarizing this state of research. The discussion was documented in a special issue of the journal published in 2018⁸⁶, selected from more than 120 papers submitted to the conference.

85 Hom, Andrew, Christopher McIntosh, McKay Alasdair, and Stockdale Liam (eds.), 2016, *Time, Temporality and Global Politics*, E-International Relations Publishing, <http://www.e-ir.info/2016/07/15/edited-collection-time-temporality-and-global-politics/> (full-text download available). Agathangelou, Anna M. and Killianm Kyle D. (eds.), 2016, *Time, Temporality and Violence in International Relations: [De]fatalizing the present, forging radical alternatives*, Routledge, 2016

86 Editorial, 2018, “The Politics of Time in International Relations”, *Millennium* 46-3, pp. 251-252.

According to the editorial of said issue, the conference attempted to elucidate the implications for international political phenomena of “time, temporality, and history,” historically and culturally specific concepts of time that have not been explicitly discussed in the theory of international relations (IR). At the same time, emphasis was placed on discussing the importance of the political dimension of time, which at first glance appears to be “an abstract and philosophical dimension of human experience. The focus was on how remembering the past, talking about the present, and anticipating the future become sites of political struggle, conflict, and violence, and the questions to be asked were as follows: who determines the concept and measure of time, why, and how do such determinants impose, institutionalize, and enforce them, and how are they affected by capitalism, liberalism, national liberalism, democracy, national liberation, and criticism? What are the concepts of time that underlie capitalism, liberal democracy, national emancipation, and the critical project? The common thread that runs through all the submissions is the recognition of the fact that there are limits to the conventional understanding of temporality in international relations as linearity, neatness, and progress⁸⁷.

Four Habits of the “Temporal Turn”

The editor’s assessment of the conference in his editorial is iridescent, and is organized as if sound progress had been made. However, an examination of the papers included in the issue reveals that this arrangement itself is based on an excessive degree of orderliness. And, surprisingly, the “temporal turn” (a term that Hutchings, considered a pioneer, dislikes, perhaps because she would rather concentrate on discussing time in relation to global norms⁸⁸), which is to be celebrated in critical theory, is rather stalled. It becomes clear that we are at an impasse.

Hom’s paper and Chamon’s paper are central to the discussion of this impasse⁸⁹. A comprehensive examination of Hom and Chamon’s arguments in conjunction with the above essays will clarify what the “temporal turn” is, what it is not, and how and why it fails to reach the maximum depth of the question I have already posed.

Hom, through questioning temporality, finds the “temporal turn”, significant insofar as critiquing mainstream sovereignty-based IR. Nevertheless, there are four habits that have been built up in the debate against the background of the temporal turn. Leaving them unaddressed would be detrimental to the progress of the temporal turn. The four habits can be divided into two habits concerning the target of criticism and two habits concerning the search for alternatives.

The habit of targeting criticism is firstly a criticism of the non-temporal nature of politics, i.e., the neglect of temporality in social science, as in the case of Pearson and others, and secondly a criticism of the tendency to regard only linear time as time. These criticisms are effective in pointing out the problem, but in most cases, they only point out and criticize the problem, and they frustrate analysis by refusing to understand the various ways in which non-temporality and linear time are used by people in a concrete hegemonic position. Criticism without an intrinsic access to the various strategies of those who manage, control, and manipulate time, in Hom’s view, only serves to reinforce and reproduce the other side’s position.

Secondly, he argues that the habit of alternatives is an argument for a variety of heterotemporalities (hereafter “heterotemporality”), i.e., temporality other than modernity or the West, as opposed to a uniform linear temporality, and secondly, a rupture of time, i.e., a continuity of linear temporality that presupposes progress in time. The second is the rupture of time, i.e., the occurrence of a sudden event that breaks the continuity

87 Ibid.

88 Kimberly Hutchings, “Time and Study of World Politics”, *Millennium* 46-3, 2018.

89 Hom, “Silent Order: the Temporal Turn in Critical International Relations”, *Millennium* 46-3, 2018, 303-330. Paulo Chamon, “Turning Temporal; a Discourse of Time in IR”, *Millennium*, 46-3, 2018, pp. 396-420.

based on the progress of linear temporality, and its impact and effect. With regard to heterotemporality, Homme believes that while it is significant to point out the coexistence of multiple and diverse temporalities by introducing an endless number of different heterotemporalities, it also leads to the accumulation of vague alternatives without transcending the point of indicating the existence of such alternatives. On the other hand, as for ruptures, to merely anticipate and expect revolutionary events that break continuity is ultimately a reproduction of classical liberal idealism, and as in the case of 9/11, what is a rupture and what is continuity can be interpreted differently depending on one's position, and therefore cannot have universal applicability as an alternative. Therefore, it is impossible to have universality as an alternative.

If this situation persists, Hom argues, the "temporal turn" will repeat Augustine's frequently quoted lament that we know what time is when we are not asked the question, but not when we are asked to explain it, and will only accumulate repetitions of the four habits in different places and different products. The only thing that is repeated and accumulated is the necessity of turning, and the analysis cannot go any deeper. According to Hom, the discussion on time should converge into a more unified and centripetal discussion based on the concepts of time and temporality, but in fact it has taken a more diffuse and centrifugal direction. Hom's own lament is that the "turn" theorists intuitively understand (apprehend) the importance of time, but they are reluctant to thoroughly grasp (comprehend) the function and action of the concept of time.

Power of the "Temporal Turn" Discourse

Next comes Chamon's argument. Relying on Foucault's analysis of the discourse, Chamon's problem is the political function of the discourse of "temporal turn" in international relations theory. The turn discourse is a political function of the discourse of "temporal turn" in international relations, which forces the researcher to analyze time, to argue against the mainstream, to make heterotemporalities or breaks with traditional time, and to emancipate oneself of such arguments. This is the function of the "turning" discourse, which forces the researcher to break away from what Homme considers to be a unified, centripetal (or essential), and thorough understanding.

Chamon calls the effects of the "turn" discourse "fortifying effects. The ritual incantation that turn-of-the-century theorists invariably repeat, invoking Augustine and citing the concepts of *chronos* and *kairos* to emphasize that "time is elusive" and that we should "seriously consider the problem of time" (talke time). Instead, these discourses are not conducive to intellectual exploration. Instead, they serve to define the way we talk about time as an object of intellectual inquiry, to set rules for organizing, governing, and allocating that talk, and to indicate how we should govern ourselves and others when conducting that study. In other words, the temporal turn's primary role is to move the researcher toward "time" far more than to move the consideration of "time" itself.

Thus, the "turn" discourse places too much emphasis on the "turn" and neglects the turn of "temporality," which should be its object, but this is precisely the function of the "turn" discourse. Thus, the "turn" discourse has the power effect of forcing us researchers, who are supposed to be the subjects of the discourse, to take the "turn" that is predetermined as a good thing. There is an implicit pressure, as Shamon describes, that anyone who does not face time is a fool, and that if he does not face time, he will dishonor his own academic reputation. As a result, the "turnaround theorists" are paradoxically engaged in a battle line in which they insist on moving away from the existing conception of time in international relations theory while at the same time insisting on the need to develop and construct a new conception of time in international relations theory, a paradox that they cannot unravel. The "temporal turn" does not change the analysis of the object, but rather, it directs the subject of the analysis, the researcher, toward a particular orientation as well as toward a particular problem, thereby failing to achieve its originally proposed goal.

Chamon does not consider the temporal turn itself to be meaningless, but if he is right, the temporal turn

in international relations is quantitatively increasing and superficially flourishing, but qualitatively it is in a state of aporia. In other words, “departing” type discussions themselves create a situation where departures fail, dragging researchers into an ant lion’s den.

In Hom’s view, the “temporal turn” only leads to research that diffuses centrifugally into one of the four habits that hinder it, and loses the opportunity to approach more fundamental questions. To overcome this situation, Homme sees hope for a more centripetal argument, that is, a “temporal turn” from intuitive to thorough understanding. In Shamon’s view, however, the “turn” discourse is not structurally designed to move the researcher in the direction of the kind of centripetal and thorough understanding Homme believes it should. Taken together, this means that, contrary to the positive outlook expressed in the introduction, the aporia pointed out by Homme are almost impossible to overcome as long as the structure of the turnaround discourse is maintained.

The Aporia of the “Temporal Turn” as a Flaw of Critical Theory

How did we end up in this situation? And how can we “break free” from this situation?

The first “why” that should be pointed out consists in the fact that the breakaway type is actually an “substituting type” as well. In other words, while the substitution type assigns time as a variable in a way that is familiar to the existing methods of social science, the breakaway type “assigns” time theory as a clue for critical theory to condemn the mainstream in line with the conflict of “critical theory versus mainstream traditional international relations theory”. Critical theory is a position that has been proposed since the 1980s, especially by Robert Cox and others, and is opposed to “problem-solving” theory, which takes the existing structures and systems of international relations and international relations studies as given premises and attempts to solve problems that arise within the framework of those structures and systems. The critical theory is a complex of theories that question the power and ideology of the structures and systems on which international relations as a phenomenon and international relations research as an academic discipline are based, relying on Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, and others. It also, attempts to elucidate the structures and processes of power and institutions. In the past, international relations theory was often criticized for importing theories from other disciplines in order to gain the upper hand in inter-ism debates, but critical theory, which plays the role of clarifying such structures, has fallen into the same trap, albeit in a different phase. In other words, the same thing may be happening again and again even in the post-ism era.

Put differently, temporal theory is broader and deeper than critical theory. Nevertheless, while it may seem useful within the discipline to use arguments such as linear vs. heterotemporality or rupture only to criticize the mainstream, it is not enough to study the scope of temporal theory and the need to consider the nature of time and its relationship to social science and, by extension, to science. It may distract the researcher from the need to consider what time really is and the relationship between time and the social sciences, and even science. The centrifugal and diffuse direction that Hom laments, combined with the power effect of the discourse that Chamon, via Foucault, denounces, is a structural problem because the social sciences and international relations theory, which should be subsumed in temporal theory, have themselves subsumed temporal theory as such.

There is no doubt that this is an aporia that critical theories in international relations, not limited to the temporality turn, have always structurally faced. Critical theory usually sets its first priority as “criticism” of the mainstream’s commitment to traditional and classical temporalism, and by criticizing said mainstream, it simultaneously gains a basis for existence within the discipline. Therefore, its proponents tend to employ various arguments only as effective tools for criticism, no matter how broad the scope of their criticism may be. As a result, they seldom consider what kind of temporalism critical theory itself, or international relations theory as a whole, presupposes, and seem to argue that they automatically, by default, stand outside

of criticism from the outset. The mainstream wears various straitjackets, assumes that it is not wearing them, and continues to criticize as long as the straitjackets are not removed. This is a method that is more or less common in discussions of critical theories other than temporal theory. Homme is aware of this aporia, and Shamon seems to depict, albeit somewhat distantly, the location of such a structure and the aspect of its action by "assigning" Foucault to it.

Second, how can we proceed with the discussion and "break free" from the aporia in which the temporal turn has fallen? To do so, it is mandatory to return to temporalism, which is the "abstract and philosophical dimension of human experience". Since international relations theory is also a culture created by humans, we have no choice but to view it as a question of how international relations theory, created by humans, deals with time in the context of the question of what time means to humans. Ironically, the Millennium editorial jumps to the political dimension of the "abstract and philosophical dimensions of human experience," effectively creating a more centrifugal and diffuse mainstream critical study (whether one calls it theoretical pluralism or not) that only serves to strengthen the complicity. The "mainstream criticism" of the "mainstream" is a superficial attempt to promote academic fads by efficiently producing more centrifugal and diffuse studies of mainstream criticism (whether or not it can be called theoretical pluralism) with only increasingly robust results. The lamentations and condemnations of Hom and Sharon will remain valid and will not be resolved without a process of starting from an "abstract and philosophical dimension" and inserting international relations into it before jumping in at the deep end. In this sense, the axis of conflict within the critical theory section is also complicit.

Thus, the inability of IR's theory of time to depart from essentialism is clearly due to the structural fate of critical theory's fundamental strategy of escapism, which relies on competitive borrowing and substitution. Chamon pointed out sharply that the theory of "turnaround" cannot move the object of turnaround very much, but rather moves us (we) who are the subject of turnaround, but it is impossible to escape from this structure as long as we continue to think from the standpoint of critical theory. We must start by considering ourselves, from the question of us in relation to the issue of time.

The challenge of chronopolitics should not be recovered by a simple substitution theory based on manipulable variables, nor should it be recovered by a breakaway theory that relies on a competitive scavenger substitution. The problem for the researcher is not to analyze the issue at first glance, but to confront it squarely in a scholarly consideration that approaches the essence of the issue.

3. Re-examining Temporality in (Social) Science from the Viewpoint of Philosophy - Shozo Omori

Critical Integration of Arguments of Temporality in Philosophy and Comparative Sociology

Philosophical and ideological debates on time have been raging since ancient times, and it is beyond the author's ability to digest and organize all of them. On the other hand, this chapter focuses on the relationship between social sciences, including international relations, and time. Therefore, at a minimum, the following three questions should be considered: first, what time means to human beings, including international relations researchers; second, what time means to the sciences, including the social sciences, including international relations; and third, what time means to society, the object of the social sciences. If we can get an overall picture of these issues for the time being, we will be able to get a guide to what to consider⁹⁰.

In this section and the following sections, we will develop a framework allowing us to grasp these three issues in a unified manner.

90 Omori, Shozo (1992), *Time and the Self*, Seidosha (The Works of Shozo Omori, Vol. 8, Iwanami Shoten, 1999). Omori, Shozo (1994) *Time and Existence*, Seidosha (The Collected Works of Shozo Omori, Vol. 9, Iwanami Shoten, 1999). Omori, Shozo (1996) *Time Never Flows*, Seidosha (The Collected Works of Shozo Omori, Vol. 9, Iwanami Shoten, 1999).

First, this section examines the philosophical theory of time developed by the philosopher Shozo Omori, especially in his later years. Then, in the next section, I will discuss the sociologist Sosuke Mita's comparative sociological theory of time developed in the early 1980s (his pen name is Yusuke Maki, and in this chapter I will refer to his works under both Mita's and Maki's names) in relation to Omori. While both authors' analyses include phase differences based on disciplinary differences, and Omori mainly centers on the first and second point, while Maki primarily focuses on the first and third point, we will comprehensively reconstruct their perspectives in a tentative cross-stitching manner. From the resulting perspectives, we present in the final section a research agenda for the study of international relations and time.

Primeval-Continuity (Proto-Time) and Linear Time

The basic scheme of Shozo Omori's argument is to present the difference between the description of the world and the ego in human daily life experience in terms of daily experience and scientific description, and to depict the relationship between the two as "superposition". In other words, the important implication is that the description of time on which science relies is different from the experience of time itself in everyday life experiences. In his later years, Omori summarized his theory of time in his so-called "Time Trilogy" (Time and the Ego, Time and Existence, and Time Does Not Flow), and this section will attempt to summarize his thoughts based mainly on this trilogy.

Omori's basic understanding of time can be summarized as follows. First of all, human beings experience time not as linear time, but as a proto continuum without linearity (proto time, but it is debatable whether we should use the term "time" or not, since it was before the recognition of "time" was established). However, due to the necessities of life, humans "transformed" prototime into linear time long before the modern era, and eventually came to understand that linear time is the essential manifestation of time for humans. In other words, hypothesis became ontology. Science was founded on the basis of linear time, and social life also expanded on the basis of linear time. Although this process contributed to the expansion and development of human activities, we cannot find the original human experience of time itself in linear time. Therefore, no matter how much we attempt to conceptually dissect linear time, we cannot find Primeval-Continuity or proto-time as the raw experience of human life, but only a "superposition" of the two.

Linear time is time "spatialized" (Bergson) by "before and after" and "simultaneously" with respect to a point time of zero duration. Before linear time was established, human experience, which is analogous to linear time, was "proto-continuous" in the sense that some experience continued uninterruptedly. In this protogenic continuity, humans can recognize the order of before, simultaneous, and after between some experience (a vaguely delimited slice of experience = slice experience) and some experience. In order to organize the order in the protogenic sequence in terms of linear time, we need the concept of "point time" of zero duration. Point time in prototemporal time is a transformation from the "moment" of "now" in the prototemporal continuity of "I, in the world, see the front of the world now," which can be called the "origin of the world concept. However, the "moment" or "now" is not a point in time with zero duration, and the meaning of the "moment" as a primordial human experience no longer exists in the point in time. The Zeno paradox, which Omori spent his entire life working on, was a warning against this alteration.

Thus, the concept of linear time as a point in time is a concept that was transformed from the prototype "moment" in the original experience, and on the basis of this transformation of the concept of point time, the transformation of continuity and temporal order was achieved. In this way, linear time itself was altered. Not only the medieval naturalists, but also Aristotle and Archimedes already tended to represent time as a straight line, but at that time the alteration of linear time was already completed, and we today assume that this altered

linear time is the only true time⁹¹.

Humans experience Primeval-Continuity and cannot experience linear time. What man experiences is the uninterrupted continuity of his experience, and as Omori states elsewhere, any interruption, no matter how slight, means death. Human beings are always “in the midst of now”. Nevertheless, human beings have transformed linear time from Primeval-Continuity and ontologized linear time long before the modern era.

Linear time as an intentional human production

Linear time has a practical role in human social life and survival. This requires “public measurement and metrology”⁹². For this purpose, “a method of indicating time and setting the length of time” must be established. The necessary conditions for this are that “the standard process must be publicly observable” and “the length of time as the difference of time indicated by the time display must be convenient for practical use,” and from this perspective, solar clocks came into use. Furthermore, in order to meet the demands of the historical sequence and the scientific world, the linear time using solar clocks was infinitely extended both in the past and in the future.

It is clear from the above remarks that time does not exist independently of us, but is something that we alone have created for the needs of our lives. The reason why the linear connections are arranged according to the temporal order of before and after is that there is a before-and-after relationship between the events in our experience. And the reason why the time axis is infinite in the past and future directions is that we have extended the time axis infinitely to accommodate the world descriptions of chronology and science. Thus, linear time is our intentional creation all the way through⁹³.

Here, the narrowness of the range of critical theory becomes clear. Since linear time has already been “falsified” in pre-modern times and critical theory is also under the control of linear time in terms of its scientific description, it is difficult for critical theory to arrive at essential considerations except by starting from a critique of the linear understanding of time itself, on which it also relies. Omori also says, “sometimes, I like to think that I am not the only one who can think about the world.”

Omori also states that “circular time,” which is sometimes referred to with affection, turns out to be isomorphic to linear time in its essence, and has no special meaning beyond that. This also shows that their argument of temporality does not reach the essentialism.

Thus, if we are to discuss “breaking out,” it is imperative to base our argument on the multilayered relationship between linear time and protogenic continuity. We must inquire into how the relationship between the human sense or consciousness of time-like things from the perspective of protogenic continuity and the human sense or consciousness of time from the perspective of linear time is reflected in various phenomena within the scope of what we call international relations.

Recollective Past and Truthfulness of the Past

The next question Omori raises is how the past, present, and future, which are expressed in linear time as before and after a point in time, are created from a proto-continuum. Omori discusses this in the framework of “linguistic production of the past”.

91 Omori, *Time and Self*, 12.

92 Omori, *Time and Existence*, 212-214.

93 Ibid., 215.

In linear time, the present is represented as an arbitrary point on the line of the time coordinate axis. Nonetheless, this does not express the meaning of the time we experience in our daily lives as a proto-continuum. As already mentioned, the present is some kind of “living middle,” and from there the “present moment” is born, which is expressed as a node in linear time. Therefore, “now-present” has the basic attributes of ever-present now (it is always “now”), current now (now-present is always flowing), and fluffy now (now-present is neither an exact time nor a time with a certain width [between times])⁹⁴. Such everyday time is the time experienced through perception and action, while point time is the time that is thought about and thought of.

What then is the “past” in everyday time? It is not perceived as time, but as time produced linguistically through recollection. Perception and action are always experiences of the “now,” and experiences of the “past,” which are not of the “now,” cannot be perceived. The experience of recall is always accompanied by the “fact of separation,” i.e., “there is or can be some temporal foreground experience in the temporal foreground of the recalled experience”. In this sense, the past is recalled. From this we can further derive the “infallibility of recall,” which states that “in the recalled past, there can be no error of recall”. Of course, there are discrepancies between recollections, but we cannot asser that the recollection itself is faulty. This is because there is no transcendent reality external to the recalled past, nor is there a transcended image of the past, i.e., there is no past experience that is completely independent of its being recollected. And since the act of recalling is basically linguistic, it can be pointed out that the past represents a “linguistic production”.

Such recall is fundamentally groundless and absurd. How and when we recall, what and when we recall it requires neither reason nor rationale. However, the mere truthfulness of recall as a subjective given is enough to confuse human society. Therefore, human beings try to formulate a “true past” in their social or group life. The criteria for this are: 1) agreement of testimony (agreement, or at least consistency, of the recalled propositions of multiple persons), 2) agreement of the recalled propositions with laws of nature, truth, economic laws, etc. (propositional content must not deviate from these laws), and 3) physical evidence (smooth connection to the present of the physical world, i.e., the present connection)⁹⁵. The “correct” past, so to speak, is a “produced concept of truth”. In this sense, truth is “a concept created based on social consensus for the purpose of practical use” and “a social institution” for the purpose of maintaining social consensus.

The grading of the present connection of past descriptions requires a complex and comprehensive judgment. The most similar is probably the complex judgment that is required when a scientific theory is evaluated. The core of the evaluation is how well the theory conforms to experimental and observational facts, but there is also affinity with established theories, the choice of experiments to be considered, the academic credibility of the proponent of the theory, and sometimes even partisanship and personal feelings. Such cases are not uncommon in the history of science and the sociology of science⁹⁶.

The past is a linguistic production, a “past narrative,” told through recollection. And since it is a recall, there is no transcendental “past itself”. And whether it is science or a murder case, the truth of the past is constructed by means of classification and induction based on the above three criteria. The meaning of the concept of “past” is also being “socially produced”⁹⁷.

94 Omori, *Time and Self*, 22-23.

95 Omori, *Time Never Flows*, 14-15.

96 Omori, *Time and Self*, 87.

97 *ibid.*, 42.

The Past as Human Production: The Association of Primeval-Continuity and Linear Time

Thus, the experience of recall in the protogenic continuum and the “objective world” described in a socially practical linear-time framework are linked by the following process.

We must control the strange experience of our recall in the family and in the company of our children and arrange it within the meaning of the “objective world”. By placing our recollections in a pre-temporal position, we become adept at understanding the meaning of “past” within the meaning of “time”. This is part of language acquisition in that it is nothing other than understanding the meaning of the past tense of verbs. While one’s recall of friends with whom one has shared a small mischief is consistent with one’s own recall, the recall of others with whom one has not shared said experience is completely different. After the meaning of the past, which centers on the handling of recalling experiences, is almost complete, the meaning of “world” and “time” will gradually expand and swell as they learn how to correctly add the hearsay past to the objective world based on the recall of others, independent of the direct recall of themselves and their immediate surroundings. With such basic training in real life, we will eventually be able to understand the stories of the distant past taught in books and schools, and even the “past story” of the Big Bang of the evolution of the universe, and bring the meaning of our own “objective world” closer to perfection. The meaning of “past” that we use today as adults is the meaning that has been created and handed down in real life, including the above-mentioned truth conditions of recall (from which the truth conditions of historians and scientists evolve). To summarize the above process briefly, “both the meaning of the past and the meaning of time are products of social production in real life”⁹⁸.

In his last years, Omori reached the view that the past and time are created in such a process of layering. Needless to say, the time-theoretic turn in international relations theory has hardly included such fundamental considerations in its scope. The reason for this is that the axis of the argument “linear time vs. heterotemporality” is likely to be only a variation within linear time, and because it does not posit time in human experience, it hardly reflects consideration of temporal experience within the field of human experience. In addition, Omori does not posit time in the human experience of life.

Omori’s perspective also suggests that there is room to consider how the history and various aspects of international relations have been produced linguistically, in the relationship between real life based on archetypal continuity, recall and the “objective world” based on linear time. It also suggests that this could be a way to examine international relations and time from a more fundamental perspective. Furthermore, if international relations as a science wants to “break away” from the linear time grasp of time, it should be able to “superimpose” Primeval-Continuity and linear time, and to create a perspective to understand the relationship between human beings and time, as well as one aspect of that relationship, international relations and time, from the perspective of the relationship between the two. We must also ask what kind of academic apparatus should be created to attain a perspective that captures the relationship between human beings and time, as well as the relationship between international relations and time, which is one of the aspects of these relationships. Katsumigaseki’s temporalist turn can only be achieved after digging down to this level of assumptions.

98 Omori, *Time and Self*, 42-43.

4 Comparative Sociological Temporalism in (Social) Science Ichimida, Sosuke (Maki, Yusuke)

Nihilism of Death

Yusuke Maki's "Comparative Sociology of Time" attempts to solve the problem of nihilism based on his findings by typifying the history of human historical views of time, centering on the question of how the human view of time is related to the "nihilism of death" and how we can escape from this nihilism⁹⁹.

Maki's "nihilism of death" is, first of all, the sense that "time annihilates everything" and that "reality is reduced to nothing" one after another in time. This is a view of logical necessity rooted in the assumption according to which "only the final result has meaning," and that "the future is the meaning of the present. The second proposition, "life is short and fleeting," refers to the "absolute futility" felt when the length of human life is measured in terms of eternity, which results from "the sense of time as the successive emptying of the past". The third proposition, "finite existence (life) is futile," is based on the irreversibility of time and "the idea that time, like space, is real as a fourth dimension extending infinitely into the future and past"¹⁰⁰.

The sensory propositions underlying these propositions are, first, "abstractly infinite time-interest" and, second, "the understanding of time as irreversible, the idea of time as spatialized and antispatialized"¹⁰¹. As long as this premise exists, "the idea that my life is futile because of my death, and the idea that "human history is futile because of the extinction of humanity" appears to be inevitable. As long as we rely on this, "all the lived past, the present, and the future can only dissipate their meaning into the emptiness beyond time, which has lost its limits". Following Nietzsche, Maki sees the sense of time in modern society as a society in which these two sensory propositions are penetrated and thoroughly realized, and tries to depict the process of its formation by tracing the process of human history in a comparative sociological manner.

Maki's nihilism of death, expressed from Shozo Omori's viewpoint, stems from the belief that linear time, which is "altered" from the Primeval-Continuity that is the prototype of temporal experience as the human experience of life, constitutes the essence. In other words, the asymmetry of the power of the superposition of Primeval-Continuity and linear time is the driving force behind the nihilism of death. It is clear that this issue of death nihilism is absent from critical-theoretical considerations that are indifferent to the existence of superimposed structures. This can be related to Oda Makoto's point that "revolutionary theory does not include aging, illness, and death". Whether it is a substituting or a de-substituting one, not looking at the superimposed structure of time results in overlooking the most crucial issues in the relationship between time and human beings.

Repetitive, Segmentary, Circular, Linear

Maki continued by describing the history of the formation of the human historical sense of time as a process in which the nihilism of death is logically penetrated through the "repetitive time" of primitive communities, which is connected to the "linear time" of modern society via the "linear time" of Hebraism and the "cyclical time" of Hellenism. The very well-known scheme is a "linear time" of Hebraism and Hellenism. This very well-known scheme, at first glance, has some similarities with the argument of "heterotemporality" in critical theory, but it is very different in essence.

First, in relation to Shozo Omori, iterative time in primitive communities is considered to be relatively close to the sense of time in everyday experience as a proto-continuum, but in fact, the repetition and oscillation

99 Yusuke Maki (1981/2003/2012), *Jikan No Hikaku Shakai Gaku (Comparative Sociology of Time)*, Iwanami Shoten (Iwanami Gendai Bunko edition, 2003, Works, 2012).

100 Ibid., 7-11.

101 Ibid., 13.

in it contain the germ of linear temporal understanding, as Omori has already described in his discussion of circular time. Linear and circular time can also be regarded as a variation of linear time according to Omori, but from the viewpoint of Maki's argument, it is not "devoid of any special meaning" as Omori says. Omori's theory of time is based on a logical formulation of the ontology of Primeval-Continuity and linear time and is relatively digital, but in order to observe in detail the diversity and fertility of the transformation of cultural time perception for human beings in the long process of the reorganization of Primeval-Continuity into linear time in the course of human history, the dichotomization of time is not a bird's eye view. The dichotomized arrangement is only a bird's-eye view. In this sense, Maki's classification of repetitive, linear, circular time, is not a simple argument for heterotemporality against linear temporality, but rather an ontology of linear time ("linear time" in Maki's arrangement) as a concept that is created by "thinking and thinking" against a primordial succession of perceptual experiences. In this respect, it is complementary to Omori's argument.

Thus, in modern society, man's independence from nature and the instrumentalization of life toward the future give rise to "a sense of time that externalizes the meaning of the present toward a future that is further away one after another," while "the dissolution of community and the independence and alienation of the individual from it" generate "an interest in time that is made infinite in an abstract way". These logics are the basis of human civilization. They have the power to exist and develop human civilization, but at the same time, they force human beings into "alienation from time and alienation from time". This is the structure of existence of time nihilism¹⁰². Maki then discusses how to deal with time nihilism. This includes the issue of how to reverse the power asymmetry of the superimposed structure, which Omori himself had noticed.

The inherent fulfillment that comes from being able to live lively

As a response to this, Maki proposes "a sense of this synchronicity that is open toward existence".

In other words, the fact that our future loses its structure of completion in finite concreteness, and the meaning of life slips toward the abstracted infinite, is based on the fact that we lose the sense of meaning inherent in our present life itself, and thus each "time" in which we can live loses its own specific fulfillment. The idea of "time" is based on the fact that we mourn the sense of meaning inherent in our present life itself, and thus each "time" in which we can live is based on our mourning of its own inherent sufficiency¹⁰³.

What is lost in existence, one seeks in time. But since time only leads us to another existence, time does not give us what we refuse to find in existence. Time is not the source of nihilism. It is nihilism that makes time exist as the culprit¹⁰⁴.

It goes without saying that this sense overlaps with what Omori calls the aspect of temporal experience in human daily life as a protogenic continuum. Indeed, it is not time that is the source of nihilism, but the way we perceive the relationship between protogenic continuity and linear time that gives rise to nihilism. The development and maintenance of civilizations and societies is not possible with singular reference to the original time consciousness of human beings, such as protogenic continuity and the past as a linguistic recall that arises from it. The important task for human beings is to maintain a sense of the consermatological meaning of reality itself within the proto continuum while also riding on linear time, so to speak.

We must seek a sense of time in which the present is enriched by the future, but not instrumentalized; a

102 Ibid., 314-315.

103 Ibid., 317.

104 Ibid., 317-21.

sense of time in which there is a clear perception of an open future, but which does not render life and history futile; and a form of life that supports this reality. Only when we recover a structure of time in which life can be complete and fulfilling in a way that is different from the community of the past from which we can no longer return, will we finally be free from the taboo of our time, that ominous shadow that pierces the very foundations of the modern ego¹⁰⁵.

To paraphrase Maki's conclusion in light of Omori's argument, the most profound problem for human beings when thinking about time is how to restore the power asymmetry of the superimposed structure of human sense of time that produces nihilism. Maki, perhaps because he has examined this issue in his earlier works such as *The Hissing of Winds* (1977)¹⁰⁶, finds the matrix in the past communal state, but from Omori's perspective, who dares to skip the comparative sociological development of humanity, no matter what kind of linear temporality we actually and practically follow, human beings are always "now the most" in the field of raw experience, in reality and in fact, no matter what linear temporality we follow, we are always "now in the midst" at the site of raw experience, and this is the original human existence. How to find hope in this depends on the theorist, but it seems almost clear that the "temporal turn" in international relations and political science has not entered into this discussion.

5 Temporal Emancipation in Academia and Temporal Emancipation in World/Humanity

Causes of Temporal Aporia in the Study of International Relations

A brief cross-stitching of the Omori-Maki scheme may take the following form. First, in the daily experience of human beings, prototime is merely a series of prototimes. From there, the idea of linear time emerged from the necessity of social and collective life in ancient times, and the truth of the past, which is linguistic recall, was socially constructed, and this was strengthened by history and science. The primitive grasp of time was a mixture of the germ of proto-temporal and linear temporal ideas. Hebraic as well as Hellenistic linear temporal ideas existed during the refinement of the modern linear temporal cognition from the linear temporal idea.

Despite these changes in time perception, human beings still experience and live in a prototemporal continuum. However, the assumption that linear time is the ontologically "correct" time, which should be false from the perspective of original experience, has come to define human beings in terms of supporting their survival and development. This is the "power asymmetry of the superimposed structure," and the modern human perception of time has undergone an ontological fall to the present day.

It is true that grasping time in terms of a "falsified" linear time concept has been and continues to be beneficial for the development and expansion of human society. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to regard linear time as the true form of time and any other experience or perception of time as false time. Both must be superimposed, which does not mean that one is true and the other false. The question is how to understand this superimposed structure and how to change it.

Ultimately, the theory of time in international relations, whether degenerate or substitutive, accepts the linear time of modernized scientific depictions as a common assumption. The reason why the substitution type is so indifferent to the problems of the assumption, and why the breakaway type falls into aporia while discussing breakaway, is that it considers the broader significance of the formation of linear time in human history to be a phenomenon unique to only one period in human history, such as modernity, sovereignty, and the state. This is because they are either unaware of the fact that they themselves are premised on linear time,

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 322.

¹⁰⁶ Yusuke Maki, *Kiryu No Naru Oto (The Hissing of Winds)*, Chikuma Shobo, 1977.

or even if they are aware of it, they cannot expand the scope of their argument because it is based on such an axis of controversy. The range of linear time must first be understood in relation to proto-time, but it cannot be discussed to that extent.

The Goal of Discussing Time

The idea that linear time is true gave rise to the development of human society based on the social sharing of time, starting with the solar clock, but it can also be the root of death nihilism. In other words, linear time itself is not the problem, but the idea of linear time as an ontological truth induces the problems of modern temporality pointed out by critical theory, as well as its positive aspects. On the other hand, the negative aspects of modern scientific linear time for human society as a whole are not entirely reducible to the concepts relied on by the so-called mainstream international relations theory. Rather, modernized scientific linear time gave birth to modern social science, not the other way around. It is difficult to say that the theory of time in international relations understands this process.

If the theory of time in international relations is to truly “break free,” it must point out and clarify the restrictions and constraints on people living in international relations that are caused by the very understanding of international relations resting on the scientifically paved linear time on which international relations theory itself relies. In addition to pointing out and clarifying how understanding international relations based on the assumption of linear time itself poses constraints and restraints for people living in international relations, it must be connected to a system of questions about how to grasp human thought and action regarding international relations in the context of the relationship between linear time and protogenic continuity, how to realize human liberation from living itself, recognizing the world rooted in the ontological absolutization of linear time. It is only natural to fall into aporia by reducing the relationship between time and human beings to a critical theory versus mainstream international relations theory, and we should start from the understanding of time at the level of human daily experience, which has been obscured by scientific pavement (Omori).

Living a life of consermatology, as described by Yusuke Maki, does not mean living “alienation from time and alienation from time” within the constraints of linear time, but it also implies living “now and now in the midst” in the sequence of actions in the prototemporal experience as illustrated by Shozo Omori. If the argument for breaking away from linear time is to be made, then the “now” and the “now in the midst” are the same as the “now” and the “now in the midst”. If there is an argument for escaping from linear time, it is not a complete denial of the limitations and non-absoluteness of linear time, but rather a way of accepting linear time in social life while at the same time living a life of superimposed consermatology.

Whether it is a substitution or a deontology, the theory of time in international relations research basically describes time based on the common premise of scientific description in linear time, which has been firmly established by modern science. What is essential is neither to posit heterotemporality in the sense of being nothing more than an anthropological variation of linear time, nor to advocate a total break between these variations. What the theory of time in international relations studies has arrived at in the last decade or so is that there is something wrong with the mainstream perception of time in international relations theory. In the end, the debate has failed to go further because it has devoted little consideration to the human-historical framework of temporality theory by trivializing it, and applied it to the trivial and myopic goal of overthrowing the Waltzian “mainstream” based on the trilogy of sovereignty, nation, and power.

Proto-Time in International Relations Theory

What, then, should be done about it? What is clear, as Omori and Maki point out, is that it is not simply a matter of returning to proto-history or primitive time. The goal is not to simulate a proto-historical or proto-

temporal theory of international relations as in Tsutsui Yasutaka's science fiction, "The Primitive Man".

One clue is how the perception of human experience as a prototemporal continuum, the past as linguistic recall, and its relationship with linear temporality construct international relations phenomena that have been described and understood seemingly only in terms of linear time. More precisely, how do linear time and prototemporal human experiences intersect in human activities proper to various international relations phenomena? International relations research must scrutinize human experience in both linear and prototemporal time.

Probably, human experience as a protogenic continuum has been discarded as unanalyzable in a scientific analysis based on linear time. However, it seems that human behavior rooted in the human experience as a protogenic continuum has existed in areas that cannot be fully disclosed by the human experience in linear time. The viewpoint that the past is recognized as truth through linguistic recall and the three conditions for social truth, not to mention Foucault's theory of truth regime, may bring new light to the understanding of the past and history in the field of international relations studies, where historical cognition and historical interpretation play a major role. The chapter is also a good example of how this chapter can be used as a basis for the study of the history of the Ottoman Empire.

If the conclusions drawn from Omori and Maki are correct, it can be assumed that the proto- or primitive-time way of life and the linear-time way of life are basically "superimposed," but the more one enters modern society, the more the latter becomes an ontology and an absolute process. This is true regardless of whether one is in the East or the West. If this is the case, the argument that non-Western heterotemporality can be established in modern Western temporality may be a misunderstanding of the essence of modern temporality. The prototemporal and primitive temporal moments are universally shared by all human beings, and they are not lost in the human experience of life, no matter how much the ontology of linear time is advanced. Of course, there have been variations within linear time, and the degree and nature of intersection between proto/primordial time moments and linear time moments will also have numerous modifications. In this sense, the heterotemporality of the sense of victory should be doubly observed.

Furthermore, the moment of human emancipation also needs to be viewed within this duality. The more important moment of emancipation does not lie in the opposition between variations within linear time. The issue for time theory in international relations is how to capture the relationship between "superpositions." It is a consideration of the relationship between using linear time to create, maintain, and expand human and social relations, and protecting, maintaining, and creating a way of life in a temporal experience (or rather, a pre-temporal experience) that brings us back to the site of human life in prototemporal time. And perhaps, this consideration depends on how international relations as a science can include prototemporal ways of life, such as consubstantial life and the sense of synchronicity that are captured in philosophical and ideological speculation. This inevitably requires a rewriting of the nature of international relations as a science.

International Relations Theory of Proto-Time and Proto-Space

This issue of time is also an issue of space, or rather, an issue of space, and both must probably be solved simultaneously. As Omori Shōzō quotes Bergson, linear time, is "spatialized" time. Yusuke Maki also pointed out the "spatiality" of linear time as mentioned above. This reminds us of what Robertson and other globalization theorists have said, namely that globalization temporalizes space. In light of the discussion in this chapter, this is strictly speaking a conversion of space into spatialized time, and logically, this seems to be rather natural.

The question is how space can be related to Primeval-Continuity. If space is also scientifically or linearly "transformed," is there such a thing as proto-space? If so, what is the relationship between proto-space and proto-time? Although the concept of linear space (vector space) exists in mathematics, can the relationship

between proto-space and linear space be compared to the relationship between proto-time and linear time? Also in space, is it possible to posit a superimposed structure with power asymmetry between the two? If so, is there a problem of human bondage and liberation from the same human-historical perspective as the theory of time? Yusuke Maki states that nihilism in space is weaker than nihilism in time (Maki 1981/2012: 7), but are we really in a position to say so? (Maki 1981/2012: 7) Can this be true? And even if it is weak, how does this nihilism affect people?

The issue that can be derived from such inferences is a consideration of how the original time-space perception in human life experience is originally formed and how the representation of “international relations” has been connected to and disconnected from that original time-space perception, as well as from the perspective of human history. The proto-time and proto-space, which are the experiences of life that cannot be organized in linear space and time, have been universally experienced by humans since the age of *Homo sapiens*, and we are no exception to this rule.

In the larger scheme of things, it can be inferred that while humans have lived through a proto-spatial experience that has never been resolved into linear time and space, they have organized their concept of time and space through linear time and space in the history of the formation and development of civilization, and have ontologized the latter. What the study of international relations must examine is the role of the phenomenon and concept of “international relations” in this historical process with regard to a space-and time-related configuration. In other words, it brings about an examination of the role played by “international relations” and “international relations studies” in the history of overlapping linear and proto-spatial perceptions of time and space. This is a point of contention that can be connected to the issue of the history of international cultural interaction, which is to elucidate the moment of an “encounter with the unknown” in terms of how people perceived, and received the phenomenon of “international relations”, as well as the discipline of “international relations studies” when they were confronted with these phenomena.

From this perspective, the question arises as to how the formation of international relations as a phenomenon and the establishment of international relations theory as a science can be positioned within the epistemological and ontological formation process of space and time (which itself is linear in time) in the modern era. It may be an issue that can be derived from the discussion in this chapter to examine the existence of the reality and study of international relations and international relations theory in the human history of interrelationships between superimposed structures of time and space.

Acknowledgements: Paul Busch (University of Heidelberg) read the draft of this translation and made numerous helpful suggestions. I would like to express my sincere gratitude for his excellent and dedicated contributions, just as he did for the paper, “‘Un Polo Loco’ Set -Trilogy on the Future of the Study of International Relations: From IR, GIR, to the Study of Global Relations and beyond”(Journal of Global Media Studies 34, March 2024).

[This research was supported by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research 18K01481.